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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three essays related to policy analysis. In the first
essay we ask, how can developing nations who face revenue mobilization issues and
large informal sectors use taxation as a means of nation building? To answer this,
we design a dynamic general equilibrium model that accounts for a large informal
sector. Contrary to previous studies that model the informal economy, we focus
on the importance of the government maintaining its social fiscal contract with its
constituents by including the provision of productive public goods in the model. By
doing so, we show that increasing taxes can be used to encourage formal sector activity
and increase revenue simultaneously. In the second essay, I develop a theoretical
outline explaining why treatment effects may lag the treatment event in the context
of local labor shocks, and examine the impact properly identifying of treatment date.
Using the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990 as a case study for a negative
labor demand shock in the Appalachian coal mining industry, I find lags in treatment
effects on the mining industry relative to policy implementation, as well as secondary
lags in the multiplier effects on the aggregate economy relative to the labor shock.
Building on this, the third essay tests the predictions of the theory in the case of a
positive labor demand shock and explores the timing of multiplier effects at the sector
level. Using the CAAA as the source of a positive labor demand shock in the Western
United States coal industry, I again find lags in the treatment effect on the mining
sector, but find variety in the timing of responses of individual sectors. I also discuss
the implications these findings have for local policy makers whose communities may
experience such shocks, as well as national policy makers concerned with future policy
initiatives such as the Clean Power Plan.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this dissertation, I present three essays on policy analysis. The first is a theoretical
model of tax and enforcement policies in developing nations with large informal
sectors. The latter two are empirical investigations on Title IV of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, which established the sulfur dioxide cap and trade system.
In the first essay, I address the issue of revenue mobilization in developing
economies who are also plagued by large informal sectors. Specifically I look at
how policy changes in taxes and enforcement can help increase the amount of formal
sector activity to grow the tax base. I run policy experiments in a small open economy
dynamic general equilibrium model to determine how changes to enforcement and
tax policy affect the relative size of the formal and informal sectors, as well as the
overall economy. Contrary to predictions in the literature, our simulations suggest
that tax increases can lead to higher rates of formal sector activity when government
revenue is used to provide productive public goods. This result is consistent with the
developmental literature that focuses on the importance of governments’ maintaining
a healthy fiscal social contract with its constituents. I also identify “tipping points” in
the proportion of government revenue dedicated to the provision of productive public
goods where this result holds.

1

In the second essay, I study the proper assignment of treatment date in the context
of local labor demand shocks. I develop a theoretical analysis for explaining why
treatment effects and potential multiplier effects may lag or lead the event that is
credited with causing the labor shock based on characteristics of the shock. This issue
is not addressed in the literature. Furthermore, treatment is viewed as one event that
affects both the extraction sector and other sectors of the economy at the same date.
I argue that this assumption is not valid and could introduce bias into the estimates.
I instead view it as a series of separate treatment events. The event that affects the
extraction sector is the first treatment event, and then the change in behavior of the
extraction sector is the second treatment event that affects the broader economy. The
date of treatment can be verified using a test for structural breaks with an unknown
break point, a method common in the program evaluation literature. To test the
predictions of my theoretical framework, I examine the impact of the Title IV of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which caused a negative labor demand shock in
the coal mining industry of Appalachia. I find lags do exist from the time the policy
went into effect and when treatment occurred. The structural break in the mining
behavior, i.e. treatment date, occurs 4 years after the policy becomes effective. I also
find that there is a lag in the treatment effect on the broader economy, which differs
with various measurements of economic output. I then discuss the implications this
has for local policy makers.
In the third essay, I study employment spillover effects of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 and consider the implications for future potential cap and
trade policies. Building on the results of the second essay, the third essay tests
the predictions of the theoretical analysis in the case of a positive labor demand
shock and also explores the timing of multiplier effects at the sector level. I use the
Title IV amendments as the source of a positive labor demand shock in the Western
United States coal industry, whose low-sulfur coal was a substitute for Appalachian
high-sulfur coal. I find lags in the treatment effect on the mining sector, but find
variety in the timing of responses of individual sectors. My results indicate weak
2

evidence of agglomeration effects as a result of the positive labor shock in the mining
sector, with the traded sectors of manufacturing and agriculture experiencing gains in
employment and total sectoral income. However, I find mixed evidence on the impact
on locally consumed sectors, with the retail sector gaining jobs while the construction
sector loses jobs. I also discuss the implications these findings have for local policy
makers whose communities may experience such shocks, as well as national policy
makers concerned with future policy initiatives such as the Clean Power Plan.

3

Chapter 2
Developing Nations and the
Shadow Economy: Addressing the
Recursive Fiscal Dilemma

4

2.1

Introduction

Developing nations rely heavily on public expenditures for state building activities.
Public investments in infrastructure and social overhead capital, such as education,
health care, well regulated and efficient credit markets, legal systems, and enforcement
of property rights, are necessary for any economy to develop and maintain a
sustainable level of growth (Brautigam et al 2008). This is particularly true in
developing economies where private consumption and investment are inadequate.
Attention in the literature is increasingly focused on mechanisms to promote growth
and development through infrastructure and social overhead capital. For example,
one study shows that public investment in developing nations can lead to crowding-in
of private investment, where $1 of public investment can lead to an additional $2 of
private investment and $1.5 of additional output (Eden and Kray working paper),
while empirical studies have found government spending multipliers to be between .4
(Kray 2014) and .5 (Kray 2015). Public sector investments require a large and stable
public revenue source, which developing nations lack due to their undeveloped private
sectors, large informal sectors, and competing uses for government funds.
Increasing taxes can be politically difficult given the fragile nature of the “fiscal
social contract” (Everest-Philips 2008) between a government and its citizenry. The
challenge is more daunting in the presence of large informal sectors that provide a well
established outlet for evasion. This flight to the informal sector shrinks the tax base,
and may reduce revenue, a phenomenon referred to as the recursive fiscal dilemma
(Schneider and Enst 2000; Fleming et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 1998). This in turn
reduces the government’s ability to provide services, such as education, health care,
and infrastructure, further constraining the human capital development and lowering
total factor productivity. As the cycle continues, domestic revenue capacity may be
further eroded. This negative feedback loop is the so called recursive fiscal dilemma.
Poor quality service delivery compromises the visible benefit to business and citizens
of paying taxes, which has been shown to be an important factor in tax compliance

5

(Westat 1980; Yankelovich et al 1984).

This damages the fiscal social contract

and hurts tax morale, which can lead to greater non-compliance (Everest-Philips
2008). Considering the important role that citizen involvement in the decision-making
process plays in maintaining a proper fiscal exchange, cutbacks in the provision of
public services without explicit consent of the public also risks raising non-compliance
(Alm et al. 92). Despite the potential for negative reactions from tax payers, revenue
mobilization as a means of state building is being seen as an increasingly important
component of effective social and economic development.
In addition to raising revenue for state building purposes, bringing micro and
small sized enterprises (MSEs) into the formal sector also provides many benefits
to the newly-formal firms. First, the informal sector is less productive than the
formal (Palmade 2005). Second, informal firms are extremely sensitive to the business
climate, which is often less stable in developing nations. Furthermore, informal firms
are often market constrained (lack access to government contracts and spending
programs), resource constrained (lack access to formal credit markets economic
development grants) and capital constrained (unable to increase capacity without
risking detection) compared to their formal counterparts (Palmade 2005). Therefore
understanding the effects fiscal policy actions have on the formal-informal choice
is critical for developing nations. However, the informal sector has a pragmatic
motivation to pay taxes to participate in the formal sector when doing so offers
tangible benefits (Baross 1990). For instance, in Mauritius the government was
able to successfully encourage MSEs participation in the formal sector by offering
targeted access to finance. In China, larger firms reported increased willingness to
pay higher rates of local taxation in return for more secure property rights. These
examples demonstrate the importance of maintaining the fiscal social contract in
order to promote tax compliance in developing nations.
We investigate two issues common to developing countries concerned with state
building: weak central government revenue capacity and the presence of large informal
sectors. Specifically, we ask how temporary changes in tax rates and enforcement
6

rates can be used to address both of these issues simultaneously.

1

Second, we ask

how does including different uses of government spending in the model affect the
best policy? This second question addresses the means in which the government
maintains its fiscal social contact as well as the overly simplified treatment of the
government’s role in the existing informal sector literature. To answer these questions,
we develop a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model, for a small, open, developing
economy, which we parameterize to Sri Lanka2 . The model accounts for the provision
of different government services, e.g. a public consumption good, a labor augmenting
service, and an informal sector that produces a non-traded good and does not have
access to government provided services. We then run simulations for different mixes of
government spending, which is funded from taxes on formal output and on penalties
assessed to detected informal activity.
Our investigation into the role that different spending mixes plays is an important
contribution to the informal economy literature, answering the question of, “what is
the best use of an increase in government resources?” An important limitation in
the literature is to refine government spending to a lump sum transfer back to the
taxpayer. In our simulations, we not only differentiate between government spending
as purchases of goods and services and government provision of goods and services,
but also between the types of goods and services provided by the government. In the
model, the government can provide a specific human capital good and a productivity
enhancing services good, both of which factor into the formal sector’s production
function. Additionally, the government can provide a public consumption good, which
factors directly into the agent’s utility function. The different uses of government
spending differ fundamentally in their purpose, the first two providing a productive
benefit and the latter providing a strictly utilitarian benefit. The inclusion of public
1

We choose to focus on temporary policy changes to reflect the uncertainty of tax and enforcement
policies in developing countries
2
We choose to study Sri Lanka because it fits the profile of a small developing country with a
large informal sector. Additionally, Sri Lanka has been the subject of previous studies which provide
useful information in parameterizing our model.
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goods in the model allows us to address the government’s attempt to maintain its
fiscal social contract with its citizens.
We first set a benchmark case where government revenue is used strictly as a lump
sum transfer back to the household, mimicking the models of existing studies. Our
simulations align with the literature where increased enforcement reduces informality
and decreased tax rates increase formal sector activity. We then model the case of
the public good, which allows for different uses of government revenue spent on a mix
of transfers and the provision of public goods. We vary the proportion of government
revenue spent on each use, which we incorporate in the model as exogenous spending
parameters, and run a variety of simulations to identify how different apportionments
of government revenues might affect the best policy.
The key result emerging from these analyses is that we are able to identify
tipping points in the proportion of government revenue dedicated to the provision
of productive public goods for which a tax increase is an effective policy. Above
this point, increased taxation leads to the desired outcome of expanded formal
sector output and decreased informal sector activity, but below this point we see
the opposite effects. This result contradicts our benchmark case and the predictions
of the literature, but is consistent with the story told by emerging literature focusing
on using revenue mobilization as a means of state building, a quid pro quo relationship
that providing visible and tangible benefits to taxpayers can increase compliance and
participation in the formal sector.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the informal
sector literature. Section 3 describes the model and the policy experiments to be
carried out. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the simulations for the two cases described above.
Section 6 provides an alternative specification of productive public goods. Section
7 conducts sensitivity analysis, while section 8 discusses the issue of government
credibility. Section 9 concludes.

8

2.2

The Informal Economy

Two facets of the informal economy literature are especially important to our
application. First is measurement of the size of the informal sector and second are
theoretical causes of informality.
Measuring the size of the shadow economy is problematic because the shadow
economy is not directly observable and there are no good proxies to enable
measurement. Schneider and his coauthors have published several studies estimating
the size of the shadow economy for large sets of countries using a structured modeling
system that relies on several explanatory variables identified in the literature as
affecting the size of the shadow economy (Schneider et al. 2010). Other methods
for measuring the size of the shadow economy include using voluntary surveys and
tax audit data ( Isachsem et al. 1982; Morgensen et al. 1995; Alm, Bahl, and Murray
1991), using discrepancies between reported income and expenditures (Franz 1983;
MacAfee 1980; O’Higgins 1989; Smith 1985; Yoo & Nyun 1998), the transactions
approach (Feige 1986), and the currency demand approach (Cagan 1958; Tanzi 1980,
1983).
While there is no way to validate the estimation results against true values,
there are some descriptive trends that emerge from the estimation literature that
can be useful, such as poorer countries like Sri Lanka and Bolivia should have higher
estimated shadow economies. Table 2.1 provides a list of the 11 largest shadow
economies relative to the size of officially reported GDP, according to Schneider et
al. (2010).
A vast literature seeks to identify factors that affect the size of the shadow
economy. High barriers to formal sector entry, such as excessive regulatory burden,
high administrative costs and high tax rates, increase the size of the informal sector
(Loyaza 1996; Schneider and Neck 1993; Fortin 1997; Rauch 1991; Sarte 2000; Straub
2003). On the other hand, higher enforcement rates and higher penalties decrease the
size of the informal sector (Turnovsky and Basher 2009; Loyoza 1996; Prado 2011.

9

Table 2.1: Countries With Large Shadow Economies
Country
Relative Size of Informal Sector Rank
Bolivia
66.9%
1
Peru
59.0%
2
Thailand
51.9%
3
Guatemala
51.3%
4
Uruguay
50.0 %
5
Honduras
49.7 %
6
Benin
49.6%
7
El Salvador
46%
8
Nicaragua
44.9%
9
Sri Lanka
43.9 %
10
Cote d’Ivoire
43.3%
11
Source: Schneider et al. 2010
Increased government corruption, less efficient formal credit markets (Straub 2003),
and simplified tax codes, i.e. fewer legal loopholes, (Schneider and Enst 1993) also
increase the size of the informal sector. While the result that simplified tax codes
encourage informality may seem counterintuitive, it is important to keep in mind that
tax avoidance, which complicated tax systems allow more opportunities for, is legal,
while tax evasion is not. When these legal tax loopholes are closed, firms are more
likely to seek out illegal means to escape taxation, joining the shadow economy (Alm
et al. 1992). In addition, the presence of non-pecuniary benefits increases household
participation in the formal sector for primary workers, but secondary workers are less
likely to do so (Saracoglu 2008; Galiani and Weinschelbaum 2007).
That increasing taxes would decrease informality is consistent with the recursive
fiscal dilemma, highlighting the importance of finding a way to raise taxes without
discouraging formality.

In an attempt to do so, Turnovsky and Basher (2009)

investigate the effect of decoupling tax rates in a general equilibrium model calibrated
to a small open economy. In a baseline model with only output taxes, the authors’
first two results support the previously discussed conclusions regarding taxes and
enforcement. But when decoupling the tax rates on wages from tax rates on capital,
they find that under the right combination of labor tax and probability of audit
10

increases and capital tax decreases, the government can still raise revenue without
a consumption loss.

Despite the breadth of the literature examining the fiscal

social contract, emphasis of the informal sector literature has been on taxes and
enforcement. Surprisingly little has been given to the role that strengthening the
fiscal social contract via increased provision of public services and investment may
have on how to best increase formal sector activity. Our paper differs from the
existing literature by considering different uses of government revenue in our model
and explores the possibility that increasing taxes can actually increase formality.

2.3

The Model

The absence of observable data on the informal sector motivates our strategy. We
develop a two sector, small, developing, open economy model with formal and informal
sectors. The household has access to foreign capital (debt). We assume imperfect
capital mobility and the economy is subject to an upward sloping supply curve of
debt. This means that the agent can not borrow at the fixed world interest rate, r∗ ,
but is subject to a country specific risk premium. The effective interest rate is thus
¯

rt = r∗ + R(edt −d )

(2.1)

The representative agent consumes both formal and informal goods, as well
as a publicly-provided good (discussed more fully below), and optimizes over a
formal/informal-labor/leisure choice. The agent maximizes lifetime expected utility
over consumption and labor according to
"
#)

−1
1−ω 1−σ
C
−
(1
−
ω)
(H
)
−
1
t
t
t
U = E Σ∞
t=0 β
1−σ
(

where C represents total consumption and H represents total labor. Total consumption, C, and total labor, H, are given by
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Ct =(cft )α1 (cit )α2 (cgt )1−α1 −α2

(2.2)

Ht =hft + hit

(2.3)

where superscripts f and i denote formal and informal sectors, respectively, and
superscript g denotes the publicly provided good. Equation 2.3 shows that the
representative agent divides his time between formal and informal activity. This
way of modeling addresses the issue of when firms are neither fully formal nor
fully informal, but they comply with some aspects of regulation or taxation. The
representative agent’s time spent working in the formal sector, hf , represents the fully
compliant activities of his business, while his time working informally, hi , represents
the part of the business in which he isn’t meeting tax obligations.
The representative agent owns all production. Formal production and informal
production are given by
Ytf = (eLt hft )θ (Zt )ψ (Kt )1−θ−ψ
i

Ytf = eAt (hit )γ

(2.4)
(2.5)

Kt is the stock of privately provided physical capital and Zt is the publicly provided
productivity enhancing good. This good can be thought of as the provision of an
efficient credit market, enforcement of property rights, and a well functioning legal
system, all aspects that are critical for formal business to grow and encourage private
investment. The formal sector makes use of the specific human capital, private capital
and the productivity enhancing good, while the informal sector only has access to
labor.
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The private capital stock evolves according to the standard capital accumulation
equation
Kt = Xt + (1 − δ)Kt−1

(2.6)

The budget constraint of the representative agent is given by
dt =(1 + rt−1 )dt−1 − (1 − τt )Ytf − [1 − (b + τt )κt ]pt Yti
+ cft + pt cit + xt + Φ(kt+1 − kt ) − T

(2.7)

where dt is the debt level in period t and (1 + rt−1 )dt−1 are the interest payments on
last periods debt. (1 − τt )Ytf and [1 − (b + τt )κt ]pt Yti are the after tax income from
formal sector production and expected income from informal production, respectively.
cft and pt cit represent the agent’s consumption of formal and informal goods, while
xt +Φ(kt+1 −kt ) represents the total cost of investment. Φ(·) is the capital adjustment
cost function given by
Φ(kt − kt−1 ) =

φ
(kt − kt−1 )2
2

Lastly, T is the government’s purchase of goods and services which factors back into
the agent’s income as a lump sum transfer.
The government enters the model through taxation of the formal market, collection
of penalties assessed on detected informal activity, and the spending of government
revenue. Government revenue is spent in four ways. It can be used for the purchase
of formal sector goods and services, T . Second, it can be used for the production
of a pure public consumption good, cg , which enters the utility function.

This

can be thought of us the provision of things like national parks. Third, it can
be used for the provision of productivity enhancing services, Zt , which enters into
the formal sector’s production function. These services, which exclusively benefit
the formal sector, include well functioning legal systems, access to efficient credit
13

markets, and enforcement of property rights. Lastly, government revenue can be used
for the provision of human capital enhancing services, Lt . Because general human
capital, such as reading and writing, is fully transferable from the formal sector to
the informal, this refers to human capital enhancing services that apply to a specific
occupation or production process, for instance training to use or service equipment
that is part of a large scale production process being used by a multinational
corporation that has opened a facility in the developing nation. The collection and
use of government revenue are given by:
Gt = τt Ytf + [(b + τt )κt ]pt Yti

(2.8)

Zt = η1 Gt

(2.9)

cgt = η2 Gt

(2.10)

Lt = η3 Gt

(2.11)

Tt = (1 − η1 − η2 − η3 )Gt

(2.12)

where τ is the tax rate on income, b is the penalty rate, and κ is the detection
rate of informal sector activity3 . pt is the price of informal goods relative to formal
goods, which act as the numeraire good. Government revenue equals government
expenditure, and η1 is the proportion of government revenue spent on the productivity
enhancing service, η2 is the proportion used in provision of the public good and η3 is
the proportion spent on the specific human capital good. The remainder is spent on
the Government’s consumption of formal sector goods and services, T .
We implement one time changes to the policy variables κ and τ which we allow
to propagate through the economy according to the following stochastic processes:

τt − τss = ρτ (τt−1 − τss ) − τ
3

(2.13)

While some models include an enforcement function (Ordonez 2014), we choose not to for
simplicity. Thus the term (b + τt )κt is the expected effective penalty rate. Results from previous
work by Ordonez (2014) suggest that costs of enforcement are outweighed by potential gains under
a model calibrated to the Mexican economy.
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κt − κss = ρκ (κt−1 − κss ) − κ

(2.14)

The stochastic nature of the tax change can be thought of intuitively as the
announcement of an initial tax increase/decrease that is systematically reduced
overtime until the rate reaches the original level.

The stochastic nature of the

enforcement increase can be thought of as a new innovation in enforcement, such as
mobile tax collection units sent by the World Bank combing through a local market
and auditing vendors to see if they were registered for the VAT. Although the policy
is a one-time sweep, a threat effect persists that may affect behavior due to the
uncertainty regarding another sweep.
Informal producers do not have access to international transportation networks,
such as sea ports, because of the presence of government officials, prohibiting from
selling their goods internationally. Thus informal output cannot be traded and must
be consumed domestically. This yields an additional market clearing condition:
Yti = cit

(2.15)

Equations for the current account, ca, and trade balance, tb, are given by the
following:

cat = −(dt − dt−1 )

(2.16)

tbt = Ytf − cft − Tt − xt − φ(.)

(2.17)

Thus, the agent’s maximization problem can be solved with the following
Lagrangian
f
t
i
maxE[Σ∞
t=0 β {U (Ct , Ht ) + λt [(1 − τt )Yt + (1 − (b + τt )κt )pt Yt + dt

−(1 + rt−1 )dt−1 − cft − pt cit − kt+1 + (1 − δkt ) − Φ(kt+1 − kt )] + T }]
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The first order conditions (FOCs) of the household’s optimization problem are
given by


−σ
Htω
α1 f Ct −
= λt
(2.18)
ω
ct

−σ
Ct
Htω
α2 i Ct −
= pt λt
(2.19)
ct
ω
−σ

Ytf
Htω
ω−1
= (1 − τt )θ f λt
Ht
Ct −
(2.20)
ω
ht
−σ

Yi
Htω
ω−1
= (1 − (b + τt ) ∗ κt )γpt ti λt
(2.21)
Ht
Ct −
ω
ht


Yf
λt (1 + φ(Kt − Kt−1 ) = λt+1 β (1 − τt )(1 − θ − ψ) t+1 + 1 − δ + φ(Kt+2 − Kt+1 )
Kt
Ct

(2.22)
Equation 2.18 tells us that the marginal utility of one unit of formal consumption
equals the shadow price of labor (λt ), while Equation 2.19 tells us the marginal utility
of one unit of informal consumption equals the shadow price of labor adjusted by the
relative price (pt ). Equation 2.20 and Equation 2.21 provide the marginal disutility
of one more unit of formal and informal labor, respectively. Equation 2.22 is the
Euler equation which relates the utility of one more unit of consumption today versus
saving it for tomorrow. The dynamic competitive equilibrium is characterized by the
set

{ytf , yti , Ht , hft , hit , Ct , cft , cit , cgt , Xt , kt−1 ,
Gt , Tt , Zt , Lt , rt , dt , cat , tbt , τt , κt , pt , λt }
that satisfies equations 2.1-2.22 and the initial conditions {K0 , d0 }.
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2.3.1

Model Calibration and Policy Experiments

We parameterize the model to represent Sri Lanka, a small, developing, open economy
with a large informal sector. To do so, we take parameter values used in the previous
literature. These values and their descriptions are given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Model Parametrization
Parameter
α1
α2
β
θ
ψ
η1
η2
γ
σ
r∗
R
σκ
στ
φ
δ
ω
ρκ
ρτ
d¯

Value

Description

.55
Formal consumption preference parameter
.30
Informal consumption preference parameter
.96
Discount rate
.33
Labor share of production, formal sector
0 or .25
Public capital share of production, formal sector
[0, .25, .33, .5] Proportion of government revenue spent on investment
[0, .25, .33, .5] Proportion of government revenue spent on public good
.495
Labor share of production, informal sector
1.5
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
.04
World interest rate
.108
Debt elastic interest rate premium
.1
Standard error, stochastic enforcement shock
.1
Standard error, stochastic tax shock
.028
Coefficient of capital adjustment
.08
Rate of capital deprecation
3
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor
.8
Persistence parameter, stochastic enforcement shock
.8
Persistence parameter, stochastic tax shock
.0074
Steady state level of debt

Source: Schneider et al. 2010

Values for β, θ, and δ are taken from Ihrig and Moe (2004) and are also commonly
used elsewhere in the literature. This value of β leads to a world interest rate of 4%.
We therefore set the country specific interest rate premium R = 10.8%, which is high,
but sets a steady state rate of 14.8%, which is the average of the period from 20062010 based on World Bank data. We set the elasticity of labor supply ω = 3, following
Mitra (2013), who parameterizes his model to an average developing economy. We
face some difficulty with regards to assigning values for certain parameters, as there
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are no reliable data for developing economies. To account for this, we run sensitivity
analysis over a range of values for α1 and α2 , and the government spending parameters
η1 and η2 to determine how robust our results are to these parameters.
Several key findings have emerged from the existing theoretical literature on the
determinants of the size of the shadow economy. We choose two of these for the
focus of our policy experiments. First, lower costs to formality, such as weaker
labor regulations, lower compliance costs, and lower tax rates will encourage firms to
operate formally. Second, increased enforcement will increase the costs of operating
informally, causing some firms to switch from the informal sector to the formal while
causing others to shut down.
The goal of government policy isn’t to eliminate informal sector activity for the
sake of doing so, but to increase formal sector activity and to be able to use revenue
mobilization as a means of nation building. In the following two sections, we apply
one time changes to the policy parameters of κ and τ . In Section 4, government
spending is used on the consumption of formal goods and services and is considered
to be “wasteful,” in that it does not contribute productivity or utility. In Section 5,
the government now spends some of its revenue on providing public goods in addition
to the wasteful spending. We present results for different spending mixes to compare
the effect of different government spending behaviors.

2.4

Benchmark Case: The Model with Lump Sum
Transfer

We first consider the case where government revenue is simply returned to the
household in the form of the lump sum transfer, as in previous literature. We use this
as a benchmark to compare our model innovations to. To model this, η1 , η2 , η3 and ψ
are set equal to zero and household preferences are set such that α1 + α2 = 1. Doing
so means that all government revenue will be spent on consumption of goods and
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services and there is no provision of public goods. In this case, the government does
not provide any tangible benefit to the taxpayer in the form of public goods, thus
does not keep its end of the fiscal social contract. The contract can be viewed as a
continuum; the benchmark case is thus a myopic form of the contract - the government
is doing nothing that is productive or constructive. As a result, we would not expect
simple transfers to play an important role in shaping the degree of informality. In
the following two subsections we allow for a one-time policy change in each of the
parameters mentioned above.

2.4.1

One Period Enforcement Increase

Intuitively, an enforcement increase causes the marginal benefit of informal labor
to decrease in absolute terms and also relative to the marginal benefit of operating
formally. This drives informal firms on the margin of shutting down to do so and
encourages informal firms on the margin of formality to move into the formal sector,
as relative costs have adjusted favorably for formal activity. Therefore we expect to
see a decrease in informal labor, output, and consumption accompanied by a possible
increase in formal output and labor. In the benchmark, there is no public good
provided to the household to support a healthy fiscal social contract between the
taxpayers and the state. The increase in enforcement can be viewed by the household
as an effective increase in taxation. Without offering some increased public good, this
could be viewed by the household as a breach of this contract, possibly discouraging
compliance and participation in the formal sector.
Looking at the top right panel of Figure 2.1, which plots the Impulse Response
Functions (IRFs) of a one period increase in enforcement, it is clear that informal
output responds negatively, as expected. The top left panel shows a decrease in
formal sector activity, contrary to our expected results of an increase or zero effect.
However, this effect is nearly zero, only reaching .175% at its peak deviation from
steady state. Government revenue increases, jumping 1.2% at the onset of the policy,
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Figure 2.1: Response to one period enforcement increase.
percentage deviations from the steady state values.

All responses are

and then declining quickly and even becoming slightly negative around the 20th
period. This reaction follows the same pattern as the decline of the enforcement rate
(not pictured). Given the prolonged decrease in formal activity as well, it is not
surprising that government revenue (bottom right) dips negative for those periods
where formal activity is recovering.

2.4.2

One Period Tax Decrease

The intuition behind a one period tax decrease is that lowering the cost of formality
encourages firms operating informally to switch to the formal sector. This should
then increase formal employment and formal output.
rate also results in a lower effective penalty.
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However, the lower tax

This lower effective penalty will

Figure 2.2: Response to a one period tax. All responses are percentage deviations
from the steady state values.
encourage additional informal activity. By examining Figure 2.2, we see that formal
employment, output, and consumption all increase, as do their informal counterparts4

We can see from Figure 2.2 that the tax decrease causes larger magnitude responses
in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state than those caused by an
increase in enforcement, which will have policy implications to be discussed later. The
4

When the value added tax (VAT) is used and informal firms use other inputs in addition to
labor, that the VAT provides an extra benefit to formality by reducing the cost of inputs. This is
not explicitly included in our model, as we choose to model informal production with labor as the
only input. This can be justified by previous work of de Paula and Schenkman (2006), where they
model an economy with formal and informal intermediate goods, formal and informal final goods,
and a VAT. They find that informal firms are more likely to conduct business with other informal
firms, and formal similarly trading with other formal firms. This suggests that informal firms do
not stand to gain much in reduced input costs via VAT rebates by switching to the formal sector as
they primarily deal with other informal firms and already avoid taxes on their inputs.
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increase in formal sector output, seen in the top-left panel of Figure 2.2, compared to
the increase in total consumption (not pictured), suggests the representative agent’s
saving habits have changed.

This can be verified by examining the investment

(bottom left) and trade balance (not pictured), respectively. Although the decrease
leads to an initial drop in the trade balance, it immediately swings positive before
beginning its gradual trend back towards steady state levels. Likewise, the debt level
initially responds to the tax shock with a large positive jump, but begins decreasing
immediately, reaching levels .25% below the steady state level before beginning its
trends back towards steady state. Another indicator of the change in savings habits
is the large increase in capital stock (not pictured). As expected, informal labor and
output rise as well due to the lower effective penalty.
As before, we are interested in what happens to government revenue. The negative
effects of the lower rates outweigh the positive effects of the increase in the tax base,
suggesting that this policy is inferior to an enforcement increase if the ultimate goal
is to increase government resources. While this policy can be seen as the government
maintaining its fiscal social contract in the sense that it is lowering the tax burden
to make up for the fact that it provides no productive of utilitarian benefit to the
household, the reduction in government revenue is counterproductive to the goal of
nation building.

2.5

Case 2: The Model with Public Goods

In the benchmark case, the model was parameterized such that the additional
government revenue raised from an increased tax base is not directed anywhere
productive, but simply returned to the household as a lump sum transfer. This
myopic specification means there is no mechanism for the government to provide
productive goods or services to the public in exchange for its taxes. If the purpose
of increasing formality is to expand the tax base so the government may carry out
more nation building activities, then the model should account for this. We extend
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the model to allow the government to divide its resources into alternative uses by
providing public goods. Furthermore, we differentiate between three different forms
of the public good. There is a pure public consumption good, cg , which factors into
the agent’s utility function, a productivity enhancing good, Zt , which factors into
the formal sector’s production function, and a specific human capital good, Lt , which
acts as a scalar on formal labor in the production function.
Intuitively, the presence of the public good should alter the economy’s response to
temporary tax and enforcement changes. For instance, the pure public consumption
good may encourage the agent to continue to operate formally in the face of increased
taxes. Operating formally, provides a “double dividend,” in which the household
benefits from income generated by operating formally, and then benefits as well from
the public good provided by taxing that formal output. This secondary benefit is
the tangible means by which the household sees the benefit from its taxes. If this
secondary benefit provided by the public good is stronger than the disincentive to
operating formally caused by taxation, then the household could view this as the
government creating a healthy fiscal social contract; compliance could improve despite
the increase in tax burden. This suggests that increasing taxes would be beneficial.
The presence of productivity enhancing and labor augmenting services, Zt and
Lt , can likewise provide a double dividend to formality in the face of increased
taxes resulting in positive impact on formal sector variables. As we observed in
the benchmark case, a reduction in taxes leads to lower levels of government revenue
despite broadening the tax base. This implies that the lower tax rate could result in
less expenditures on maintaining a functional business environment and providing
labor augmenting services. This would decrease returns to formal sector inputs,
reduce private investment and could outweigh the benefits of decreased taxes, leading
to an overall decrease in formal sector activity. On the other hand, a tax increase
would have the opposite effect, increasing formal sector activity. The intuition behind
the positive enforcement shock remains the same as in the benchmark case, although
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we expect more sustained positive impacts in formal sector production as a result of
the increased private capital accumulation.
To fully investigate the effects of the provision of the public goods, we consider
multiple spending mixes and compare the results. In the main discussion section, I
present and discuss the following three combinations:
• (η1 = η2 = η3 = 0) Benchmark case
• (η1 = η2 = η3 = .10) Below the “joint tipping point”
• (η1 = η2 = η3 = .11) At the “joint tipping point”
• (η1 = η2 = η3 = .12) Above the “joint tipping point”
• (η1 = η2 = η3 = .25) Above the “joint tipping point”
As will be demonstrated in the following subsections, this set of spending
mixes demonstrates the existence of a “joint tipping point,” where combinations
of government spending in excess of this level yield positive responses from formal
sector variables in the face of tax increases, and below yields negative. The results
of additional spending mixes are presented in the appendix, including each use of
government revenue in isolation.

2.5.1

Enforcement Increase

Figure 2.3 shows consistent responses to increases in enforcement across the different
spending mixes with very little variation. In the baseline case, the response of
formal output (top left) and private investment (bottom right) are slightly below
the other various specifications of spending mixes. However, the overall behavior of
each variable is consistent in shape. The relatively lower formal output and private
investment can be explained by the household’s response to the changes in marginal
benefits from additional capital. As government revenue increases from increased
penalty collection, the government can now spend more on the specific human
24

Figure 2.3: Response to one time tax increase for different values of η1 , η2 and η3 . All responses are percentage deviations
from the steady state values.
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capital good and productivity enhancing services, increasing the marginal productivity of labor and capital. Increased marginal productivity of these inputs results in
the household choosing to allocate more time and resources to them. As expected,
informal output (top right) decreases in response to the increase in the effective
penalty rate.

2.5.2

Tax Increase

Figure 2.4 shows that responses to a tax increase are consistent across spending mixes
for informal output and government revenue. However, the behavior of formal output
and investment both change as more government revenue is directed towards public
goods rather than the lump sum transfer. The top left panel shows that formal
output can respond positively in the face of a tax increase, indicating that when the
government spends its revenue on productive means that the incentive to operate
formally outweighs the increased burden of higher taxes. There exists a tipping
point in the amount of revenue dedicated to maintaining the social fiscal contract.
Considering the case where government revenue is spent equally across the different
public good, this occurs when that proportion is 11%, such that if the government
spends more than 11% on the specific human capital, the labor augmenting services,
and the public consumption good each, that raising taxes produces the positive
effects on output that are the goal of policy. This same tipping point exists for
private investment as well. In the benchmark case, private investment responds with
a sharp initial decrease and makes a concave approach towards steady state. However,
when other uses of government spending are added to the model, private investment
recovers to positive deviations from steady state, with the effect amplified the higher
the proportion of government revenue devoted to productive uses. This change in
household savings behavior can be explained by the increased marginal returns to
capital as other complimentary inputs into formal production are increased as well.
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Figure 2.4: Response to one time tax increase for different values of η1 , η2 and η3 . All responses are percentage deviations
from the steady state values.
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When introducing each of these public goods in isolation, tipping points can be
found that produce the same positive effects for both the specific human capital
good and the productivity augmenting services. However, these tipping points are
at 29% of revenue when only used on the specific human capital good and 35% for
the productivity augmenting good only. While there are numerous combinations
of spending that can produce the tipping point, the key take away from the “joint
tipping point” found with all capital goods provided, is that when the different types
of capital goods are used jointly this tipping point can be achieved at a lower level
than each of these goods in isolation. It is also worth noting, that while introducing
the public consumption good into the model in isolation does dampen the negative
effect seen in the benchmark as the proportion spent on it increases, there is no level
such that formal output responds positively to a tax increase.5

2.6

Alternative Specification of Productivity Enhancing Good

To this point, the formal sector productivity enhancing public good has been described
in the context of services that are exclusive to the formal sector, such as protection of
property rights, well functioning legal systems, and efficient credit markets. Another
useful way to think about this would be as a publicly provided capital good, most
easily thought of as infrastructure. Examples of infrastructure that are exclusive
to the formal sector include access to major sea ports and air terminals, which are
essential if a firm wishes to trade internationally. Infrastructure exclusive to the
formal sector could also be thought of as the legal and financial infrastructure required
to provide the aforementioned productivity enhancing services, like well functioning
legal systems and credit markets. Maintaining the infrastructure that supports these
5

Furthermore, a very similar joint tipping point of 12% is found when only including the specific
human capital and productivity augmenting goods without the presence of the public consumption
good
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systems requires a continuous government investment and the quality of these services
would decline without doing so, much the same way physical capital stock declines
without continuous investment. To include this in the model, the additional equations
are added:

Xtg = η4 Gt

(2.23)

g
Ktg = Xtg − (1 − δ)Kt−1

(2.24)

Tt = (1 − η1 − η2 − η4 )Gt

(2.25)

Equation 2.13 rewritten as

And the formal sector production function now becomes
Ytf = (eLt hft )θ (Ktg )ψ (Kt )1−θ−ψ

(2.26)

The impulse response functions for one time increases in enforcement and tax rates
are given by Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6, respectively. Like the specific human capital
good and the productivity augmenting good, the publicly provided capital good is
also able to generate a double dividend to working formally, allowing the government
to achieve both of its goals of increased revenue and increased formal sector output
with a tax increase. Also similar to the other productive public goods, there is a
tipping point for which this result holds, although at 12%, this tipping point is lower
than the tipping point of the other two goods when introduced in isolation.
To investigate the effects of the provision of the public capital good, we first
consider several spending mixes and compare the results. For simplicity, the other
productive uses of government revenue are not included so that we may focus on the
effect of productive government capital in isolation. The four spending mixes are:
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• (η4 = .33, η2 = .33) to represent equal spending across all three uses
• (η4 = .50, η2 = 0) to represent the case where only the public capital good and
lump sum transfer
• (η4 = 0, η2 = .50) to represent most half of revenue being diverted towards the
lump sum transfer and half towards the public consumption good
• (η4 = .50, η2 = .50) to represent the case where half of revenue is diverted to
public capital good and half towards the public consumption good.

2.6.1

Tax Increase

Figure 2.5 shows that responses to a tax increase are consistent across spending mixes
with one exception - the case where no public productive capital good is provided.
In the spending mixes where public capital is provided, we see the positive effects on
formal sector variables (top left and bottom right panels). Despite an initial drop at
the onset of the policy change, both formal output and formal labor (not pictured)
recover to positive deviations from steady state, peaking around the 10th period
before beginning to steadily decline back towards their steady state levels. In the
case where the government does not provide the capital good, formal sector variables
behave as they did in benchmark case. This suggests the existence of a tipping point
in this specification as well.
We identify this tipping point at around 12% ( η4 = .12). Below this tipping
point, we see results similar to that of the benchmark case, where increasing tax rates
decreases formal sector activity, but increases government revenue. Above this point,
increasing tax rates increases both government revenue and formal sector output,
which is the desired effect. There is a second, upper tipping point for η4 , such that
after passing η4 = .4, further increases in η4 lead to a dampened response in formal
sector variables. For the IRFs when η4 = .50, the positive response in formal output
and private investment is less than that of η4 = .33 and η4 = .25.
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Figure 2.5: Response to one time tax increase for different values of η4 and η2 . All responses are percentage deviations
from the steady state values.
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The lower tipping point for η4 in response to the tax increase has greater
implications for policy for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the changes brought
by the tax changes are greater than that of the enforcement increase, so regardless
of the side of the tipping point a country is on, tax policy remains more effective
than enforcement in terms increasing the size of the formal sector. The second reason
is that the upper tipping point for η4 under an enforcement shock is a much higher
proportion than a developing nation would reasonably be devoting to public provision
of productive capital.
Focusing on the instances where a proportion of government revenue above this
12% tipping point is dedicated towards the productive public good, this result
highlights the relationship between providing a productive return on the taxes paid
by the household and compliance. This is particularly true given in the way we have
described our public capital good as social overhead capital, including enforcement
of property rights, legal protection, and access to well functioning credit markets. As
discussed earlier, these social capital “goods” have been shown in China and Mauritius
to encourage compliance because they allow firms to grow more. The results from
our policy experiments confirm these findings.
Another important finding is the relationship between government investment and
private investment. Our simulations find a positive relationship, providing theoretical
support for the “crowding-in” effect discussed by Eden and Kray (2014).

2.6.2

Enforcement Increase

Again we see consistent responses to positive enforcement shocks across the different
spending mixes with the same exception as before - that in the case of zero public
capital provision. From the top left panel of Figure 2.6, we see that when public
capital is provided, there is an almost immediate and sustained increase in formal
output. As with the benchmark case, the increase in the enforcement rate results in
an increase in the effective tax rate.
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Figure 2.6: Response to one time increase in enforcement for different values of η1 and η2 . All responses are percentage
deviations from the steady state values.
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But in the case of the public good, the government is able to maintain its credibility
and its responsibility to the fiscal social contract through the provision of public
capital, thus allowing it to improve compliance and increase participation in the
formal sector, similar to the tax increase. Also similar to the tax increase, accounting
for the public consumption good in the model has little effect when considered
without the provision of public capital. The same tipping points in the proportion of
government resources devoted to the provision of the public good are present under
an enforcement shock as well.

2.7

Sensitivity Analysis

We now conduct sensitivity analysis to determine to what extent our specification of
the agent’s consumption preferences might affect the outcome of the model. These
parameters are not directly observable and no reliable estimates exist in the literature.
For this analysis, we set η4 = η2 = .33, to represent equal proportions of government
resources allocated to each use.
As can be seen in Figure 2.7, the IRFs for our variables of interest, formal sector
output and government revenue, the results are not dependent on the specification
of household preferences under a tax increase. There are however, some differences
in the way informal output (top right) and labor (not pictured) respond. As α1
decreases from the top of the range at α1 = .55 to the bottom at α1 = .15, the IRFs
for informal labor and output shift down, to the point where the initial negative shock
in informal sector variables is unable to recover to positive values until near period
30. For α1 = .55 and α1 = .33 these variables return to a positive response almost
immediately. The preference specification of α1 = .15 is consistent with the notion
of having low tax morale or a general distrust of the government, which means that
rather than participating in the regulated and taxed formal sectors, most households
prefer to participate it in the informal sector.
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Figure 2.7: Response to one time tax increase for different values of α1 and α2 and fixed η2 and η4 . All responses are
percentage deviations from the steady state values.
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This explains the relatively smaller response of the informal sector in the face
of a higher tax rate (and therefore higher effective penalty) than to the situation in
which higher preference weights are placed on the formal sector, indicating higher
tax morale and a greater desire to participate in formal markets. However, more
important for policy, is that different combinations seem to have little to no effect on
formal sector variables or government revenue in response to a tax shock.
The responses to increased enforcement are also largely the same regardless of
household preference specification (Figure 2.10), with one notable exception. Again
the case of α1 = .15 results in a markedly different IRF than for other values
tested, this time also in formal sector variables. In the case of α1 = .15, formal
labor (not pictured) and output (top left) IRFs follow the same pattern as other
specifications of α1 , the effects are just larger in magnitude. This amplified response
in the case of higher relative preferences for the informal good can also be explained
by vertical reciprocity. This concept in behavioral tax compliance refers to similar
individuals receiving different tax treatment, in this case, some firms not paying
their taxes. When social attitudes reflect a high preference for participation in the
informal economy, this may discourage others from wanting to participate in the
formal sector who otherwise would (Bazart & Bonein 2014). When the government
increases enforcement, the positive effects seen at other specifications of household
preferences are amplified because even more firms are choosing to operate formally
due to the increased fairness of the system. The attitude of “other firms aren’t paying
their taxes so why should I?” is lessened.

2.8

Government Credibility

If an unannounced one time policy change, such as a tax or an enforcement increase,
can cause positive effects that persist for longer than the duration of the policy change,
then it should follow that an announced permanent policy change should cause a
permanent shift in behavior.
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Figure 2.8: Response to one time enforcement increase for different values of α1 and α2 and fixed η2 and η4 . All responses
are percentage deviations from the steady state values.
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Figure 2.9: Response to a permanent tax increase known with certainty . All
responses are in levels of the variable.
Indeed, this is what we see in Figure 2.9, which plots the behavior of selected
variables in response to an expected permanent tax increase when government capital
is provided in the model. The top left panel, shows that formal output immediately
decreases, as the costs of operating formally increase.

However, formal output

begins increasing and surpasses its original steady state level by period 30. This
can be explained by increases in tax revenue, which in turn leads to higher levels
of government investment, as depicted in the lower left panel. This increase in
government investment then leads to higher marginal productivity of formal labor,
increasing the marginal returns of formal labor and private capital accumulation.
This effectively increases the marginal benefit of operating formally to the point of
offsetting the increase in taxes. The effect is not immediate because it takes time for
the public capital good to accumulate.
Yet a permanent policy change is not a realistic option, particularly for developing
nations, which may have credibility issues. If the household does not believe the
government’s commitment to a policy change is credible, it will act as if the change
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Figure 2.10: Response to a 10 period tax increase known with certainty . All
responses are in levels of the variable.
is temporary. Developing nations are much more likely to face credibility issues
than developed nations due to their relatively less stable political nature. Regime
and party changes are frequent, and new leaders may be quick to undo an unpopular
move such as a tax increase to separate themselves politically from the previous ruling
party. Furthermore, the household may not trust the government’s commitment to a
policy. Figure 2.10 depicts the responses of the economy in the case of an announced
temporary shock, that is, one that the household believes to be from a non-credible
government.
The policy is announced in period 1 and lasts for 10 periods, which is known to
the household. Therefore, the household can begin adjusting behavior in response
to the shock right from beginning, during the shock, and in anticipation of when
the shock ends. The top left panel shows formal output begins to fall slightly in
anticipation of the shock, and drops sharply in period 1. However, in period 5,
output begins to rise, even before the tax increase returns to normal. This follows the
same explanation as in the permanent shock that government investment increases
marginal returns to formal labor and private capital, thus producing more formal
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sector output. Unlike the permanent case, however, the response of the formal sector
is convex rather than concave. This is because after the tax rate declines back to
its original level, government revenues fall as well. The response is not immediate
because the increased level of output still produces higher tax revenue and therefore
more government investment than the original steady state level, but it is declining.
The behavior of the formal sector in this case closely follows the behavior of formal
sector output in the case of the stochastic simulations. Given that this is how the
household will behave when the central government faces a credibility issue, even
an announced permanent policy change will produce similar results as the one time
policy changes presented in our stochastic model.

2.9

Conclusion

Revenue mobilization is a serious issue for developing nations. A complicating factor
is the recursive fiscal dilemma, brought on by the presence of large informal sectors
of the economy. Bringing informal firms into the formal sector while using tax as
state building is thus a critical issue for these nations. Existing compliance literature
has assumed a simplified treatment of the government’s role in development, despite
studies in other lines of literature that show its importance. We address this gap
by investigating policy actions in a small developing DGE model that accounts for a
large informal sector and productive public expenditures.
We find that when government revenue is used for the provision of productivity
enhancing public goods that only the formal sector has access to, increasing taxes
is actually the best policy for achieving the goals of increased revenue and increased
formal sector output. We focus on a specific human capital good, such as job specific
training that would only benefit workers in a large formal firm, and productivity
enhancing government services, such as well functioning legal systems and credit
markets. Furthermore, there is a tipping point in the proportion of government
revenue used for the provision of public goods in which raising taxes is the best policy
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for achieving the governments dual objective of increasing revenue and increasing
formal sector output.
In our model, which is parameterized to Sri Lanka, we find that if the government
dedicates below the joint tipping point of 12% of total expenditures (i.e.

11%

dedicated towards the specific human capital and 11% dedicated towards the
productivity enhancing service), easing the burdens of formality through reducing
taxes is the best policy.
literature.

This aligns with the existing informal sector economy

However, for countries above this tipping point, our model suggests

that increasing taxes is actually the most effective policy, contrary to the existing
literature. This 11% joint tipping point is lower than the individual tipping points
for each of these services when introduced in isolation: 29% of revenue when only used
on the specific human capital good and 35% for the productivity augmenting good
only. This suggests that a diversified mix of productivity enhancing services offered to
the formal business owner will be more cost effective than committing more resources
to a single program.
The identification of tipping points shows that as long as enough revenue is
dedicated to the provision of productive services, the increased returns to operating
formally now outweigh the increased costs to informality brought by increased taxes.
This result is consistent with a growing body of literature focused on developing
nations using tax revenue as a means of state building. Many of these studies focus
on the central government’s obligation to maintain an unofficial fiscal social contract
with its constituents through providing them with tangible benefits in exchange for
their tax dollars and maintaining their participation in the fiscal exchange. This is a
key result with potential to change how developing nations look to address the fiscal
issues caused by large informal sectors.
The results of our analysis have strong implications for the best practices in dealing
with the negative effect informality can have on a developing nation. It is important
to keep in mind that the goal of policy is not necessarily to decrease informality
for the sake of doing so, but rather to increase formality so that the tax base can
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be increased and the increased government revenues can be used for nation building
activities. Given this and the assumption that government resources are directed
effectively to increase formal sector activity, the use of one time increases to tax rates
and enforcement on the informal sector both lead to the desired effects of increased
government revenue and increased formal sector activity, with the former having
longer lasting and more pronounced effects.
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Chapter 3
Resource Extraction Booms and
the Proper Identification of
Treatment
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3.1

Introduction

Labor demand shocks occur at various levels, from national to local. These shocks can
be driven by changes to product demand or the production function, each affecting
the derived demand for labor. At the local level, shocks can be the result of an
industry-specific event, such as the discovery of a natural resource or a firm’s decision
to open or close a large facility. In the case of an export sector’s positive shock, it is
often thought that the new economic activity generated will have positive spillover
effects on the existing local businesses and, therefore, other industries’ labor markets,
resulting in a multiplier effect. Politicians often vocalize the importance of bringing
new firms to a region to stimulate economic growth. Negative shocks are feared to
have the opposite effect, and policy makers fight to oppose such events. However, it
is difficult to determine the true effects that such economic shocks have on the local
economy because there is no way to know for certain how the local market would
have progressed otherwise. It is plausible that an observed increase in employment
in one industry crowded out expansion in other industries.
Labor demand shocks in natural resource-extraction sectors serve as an excellent
example to study localized shocks’ effects. Whether the change in an extraction
sector’s activity results from an innovation, the discovery of new reserves, price
changes, or a policy-driven demand change, these events can provide a natural
experiment in which to study local labor shocks’ effects.

Within the resource-

extraction literature, two different lines of thinking offer competing predictions about
the impact of large endowments of natural resources.

On the one hand, trade

models predict that these regions can benefit from positive shocks in the resource
extraction sector, while concerns of a natural resource curse driven by Dutch Diseasetype effects are also valid. This study attempts to analyze the effects of a resource
extraction sector’s labor demand shock by examining the effects of the Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, and contributes to the existing literature by identifying
the effects of booms/busts in local resource extraction sectors.
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The SO2 cap-and-trade permit system implemented by Title IV of the CAAA acts
as a tax on the higher-sulfur bituminous coal mined throughout central Appalachia.
The resulting decrease in demand for this coal led to stark drop offs in mining
production throughout the region. As in many other studies in the literature (Black et
al., 2005; Weber, 2013; Feryer et al., 2015), this study used a Difference-in-Differences
(DID) framework in which a control group of non-mining counties acted as the
counterfactual to the mining counties comprising the treatment group. In addition
to further analyzing an issue that has implications for both local and regional policy
initiatives, my study also focused on the importance of properly selecting treatment
dates, an issue not thoroughly explored in the literature. For instance, Black et al.
(2005) selected treatment dates based on coal prices’ behavior. However, that may
not be the best selection strategy. First, while coal prices are certainly a major factor
in determining the coal industry’s behavior, measures of the industry’s activity, such
as employment and wages, may not fall exactly in line with prices.
Additionally, in studies concerned with spillover effects into other sectors and
multiplier effects, it is important to note that it is the change in employment, earnings,
and non-payroll spending in the extraction sector that generates these effects, not
the event that affects the resource extraction sector. This also has implications for
selecting the proper treatment date concerning spillover effects. If there is a significant
lag or lead in the mining sector’s response, the timing of the response of the local
economy’s other sectors will also be affected relative to the event, thus causing the
labor shock in the extraction sector. Furthermore, there may be lags or leads in the
non-mining sectors’ response to the change in mining employment and wages, and
these lags may differ both across and within sectors for different variables of interest.
Understanding these lags is critical to local policy makers, particularly in the
case of an expected negative shock such as the CAAA. Although these policy makers
might be powerless to prevent the policy from being implemented, they are still
in a position to best prepare their community for the economy’s potential negative
downturn. Policy makers in communities experiencing similar booms, such as fracking
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towns in the American West, might also find this information useful as historically
busts inevitably follow resource extraction booms. This study’s results could help
policy makers better position their communities while times are good in preparation
for potential bust periods. For these reasons, I propose an alternative method for
examining a resource extraction boom’s effects. This method identifies the proper
treatment date by borrowing techniques from the program- evaluation literature.
First, I devised a theoretical framework to predict whether the resource extraction
sector should lag or lead an exogenous shock based on the shock’s characteristics, and
conducted an empirical examination to test my theory’s prediction using the CAAA. I
used the test for structural change with an unknown breakpoint that Andrews (1993)
proposed to properly identify the treatment date in the mining sector before using a
simple trend break analysis approach to identify the CAAA’s effects on the industry.
Then, having identified the proper treatment date and confirming that negative effects
did exist in the industry, I used the test for structural change on aggregate measures
of economic output, including county-level employment, annual payroll, and the
number of establishments. As I expected, the timing of the data’s structural change
occurred after treatment occurred in the mining sector. Additionally, the structural
break for my three measures of interest all occurred at different times. From this
finding, I conclude that incorporating this step in the process for measuring potential
spillover effects from local resource extraction booms is critical in producing more
accurate estimates and provides improved understanding of the timing of events.
This information can be useful to local policy makers who may have some say in
whether or not to allow new operations or expansions in existing resource extraction
operations. They may also use this information when considering long-term financing
of public expenditures, which may become more difficult with large reductions in tax
revenue from decreased mining activity.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous literature
and describes the theoretical reasons lags or leads may exist in response to the events
that actually cause the labor shocks. Section 3 details the CAAA’s background and
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my data. Section 4 discusses my empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results.
Section 6 is the conclusion.

3.2

Previous Literature and Theoretical Framework

A diverse body of literature has emerged that investigates labor shocks arising
for a variety of reasons, including large plant openings (Fox and Murray 2004;
Greenstone and Moretti 2004), the creation of government-designated enterprise zones
(O’Keefe 2004; Busso and Kline 2007; Kolko and Neumark 2010; Hansen 2009), and
military base closings as a result of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
recommendations of the late 1980s (Dardia et al. 1996; Krizan 1998; Hooker and
Knetter 1999). The studies which have found modest effects as a result of base
closings, are particularly interesting because those closings represent a negative labor
shock, similar to that of a contraction in the natural resource extraction sector that
I studied. These results suggest that the contraction of an industry thought to be
providing vital economic support to the local economy might not be as important as
perceived because the lost economic activity is made up for elsewhere.
Michaels (2010) conducted a study of the long-term economic impact on counties
located over significant oil fields. Rather than finding inhibited growth seen with
resource-based national economies (often referred to as the resource curse, Sala-iMartin et al. 2004; Sachs and Warner 1997; Sachs and Warner 2001) and in some
instances at the county level (Douglas and Walker 2013), Michaels found positive
effects on population growth, education, and manufacturing. However, my study
focused on the short-term effects of a boom in local resource extraction. Several
particularly relevant studies have explored these effects.
Matheis (2015) examined county-level outcomes in coal mining counties for
population, median family income, as well as employment levels in several other
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sectors during 1870-1970. In his study, identification came from county variation
in three different measures of lagged coal production, where each accounted for
different time frames, allowing him to assess short-term and long-term impacts. He
found evidence of short-run positive spillover effects on employment levels of locallyconsumed sectors but found negative long-run effects, in contrast to Michaels’ (2010)
results. He also found negative short-run and long-run impacts on manufacturing
employment, providing evidence supporting the crowding out effect. In a study
examining the local employment effects of a boom in natural gas fracking in the
Western United States, Weber (2012) shows that total employment increased by 1.5%
on average for boom counties and that incomes increased an average of 2.6%. These
findings are in line with theoretical predictions.
Black et al. (2005) and Marchland (2012) examined a cycle of boom and bust in
resource extraction. Identifying treatment areas as counties or census division tracts
deriving 10% of total income from resource extraction, they used DID estimators
to examine booming resource sectors’ spillover effects. Black et al. found that a
boom resulted in a 2% annual increase in total employment in treatment counties
and contracted 2.7% annually during the bust. Job multipliers were also calculated,
finding that every 10 jobs created in the mining sector led to approximately 2 jobs
for the local sectors of construction, retail, and services. Again, the bust seemed to
have stronger effects than the boom because for every 10 coal jobs lost, 3 jobs across
other sectors were lost. Marchalnd (2012) also found booms had positive impacts on
total personal income at the county level; but contrary to Black et al., he found no
evidence of contraction during the bust. The bust’s lack of effect compared to the
boom suggests the presence of more permanent benefits through agglomeration effects
as Michaels (2010) discussed. Marchland also calculated jobs multipliers, finding that
every 10 jobs created in the energy extraction sector created 1.2 jobs, 1.7 jobs, and
3.6 jobs in the construction, retail, and services sectors, respectively.
A common element throughout the literature is how the treatment date was
selected. While dates were reasonably selected within the range of the various price
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appreciations or surges in extraction visible in the data, appropriate lags have not
been considered to maximize the estimate’s accuracy. Marchland (2012) and Black et
al. (2005) adopted similar strategies by identifying periods with increasing resource
prices as boom periods and decreasing prices as bust periods, while not accounting
directly for mining sector behavior. Focusing on the fracking boom in the American
West, Weber (2012) discussed the fact that the treatment’s timing is unclear during
the boom. He noted that the construction of wells is labor intensive up front and
that the influx of construction crews during well installation could be the labor shock
associated with the fracking boom. He also considered the effect of royalties paid
to land owners and the increased tax revenues in addition to the crews operating
the wells (relatively small compared to the construction crews) as being the driver
of the non-extraction sector demand boom. He used the number of new wells drilled
as a proxy for the influx of construction workers, though he lacked any empirical
confirmation of this choice.
Furthermore, the treatment date was assumed to be the same between the
extraction sector and the non-extraction sectors. I view this assumption as a second
potential source of bias in the estimates. This essay contributes to the resource
extraction literature by addressing both of these issues. The following subsection
discusses these assertions’ theoretical underpinnings.

3.2.1

Theoretical Framework

The goal of this section is to describe the economy as it transitions from an initial
equilibrium to a “boom” period equilibrium, and from the boom period equilibrium
to a “bust” equilibrium. I build on the analytical framework provided by Parker and
Jacobsen (2014) and Corden and Neary (1982), but focus more on the theoretical
underpinnings of the timing of the local economy’s response. Consider a local economy
with a natural resource endowment. For simplicity and to remain in context with
this study, assume this resource is coal. Now consider three sectors within the local
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community: the coal sector; the locally consumed sector (construction, retail and
services); and the traded sector (manufacturing and agriculture). In equilibrium,
firms operate in competitive markets.
Booms
Beginning in equilibrium, an unanticipated positive shock to the demand for
coal raises the coal mining’s profitability in the endowed communities. To increase
output, coal companies look to expand production in existing mines by increasing the
number of shifts, as well as opening new mines, thus increasing land rent payments
to local landowners in the form of leasing rights, royalties, and land purchases. The
increased labor demand from the mining sector drives up total employment and total
income. If labor markets are already tight, then this will also drive up wages and
encourage immigration. Some of this new income is then spent in the local economy,
increasing demand in the non-tradeable sectors of retail, services, and construction,
thus generating multiplier effects. The increased business-to-business spending as the
mining companies increase their demand for local services also contributes to this
effect. As demand increases, existing firms are able to experience positive economic
profits in the short run. However, these profits induce new firms to enter the market
until profits are competed away to the point that potential proprietors’ expectations of
the boom’s length no longer justify the investment of opening a new business. It is also
possible that non-mining sectors, both tradeable and non-tradeable, could benefit in
the long run from new infrastructure, technology spillovers, and agglomeration effects,
as well as improvements in public services financed through increased government
revenue from an enlarged tax base.
However, there are some potential downsides. First, increased inward migration
and business expansion may make provision of public services less efficient or may
lower the overall quality as they become subject to congestion, despite increased
government revenue. Second is the potential increase in wages and other locally
sourced input factor prices. If the market for factor inputs is already tight, a sudden
increase in demand causes prices to rise as well. Migration into the booming region
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could mitigate this effect on wages; but other factor inputs with fixed supplies (such
as land) or upward sloping supply curves (such as raw materials and energy) would
face increasing costs. These increased costs could deter expansion of existing firms
or entry of new firms. As traded goods sector’s output price is determined by the
national economy, rather than locally, the sudden rise of factor input prices could lead
to contraction in the size of traded sectors competing for locally supplied factor inputs,
in turn leading to crowding out. This price effect is analogous to the Dutch Disease
models’ exchange-rate effect at the national level. Particularly true for Appalachian
coal mining is the land use story, in which agricultural and productive timber tracts
are destroyed to create new mines. This is in contrast to other types of resource
extraction such as oil and natural gas wells, which simply require a vertically placed
drill in a small plot of land and do not diminish the surrounding area’s productivity
as much compared to coal mines. The unrecoverable change in land use associated
with coal mines is also consistent with the Dutch Disease’s de-industrialization story.
Busts
On the other hand, an exogenous event may also cause in the demand for coal
to unexpectedly decrease, thus causing a sharp decline in mining activity, which is
manifested as a negative labor shock and a negative business input shock as the mining
sector demands fewer services. This effect could result from the boom event ending
or an unrelated event like regulation or a competing product entering the market.
The immediate effect corresponding to a sharp decline in production is lowered
employment and income for the mining sector, as well as decreased royalty payments
to and land purchases from landowners. As demand for local goods and services
decreases, these sectors experience layoffs and firm closures, generating negative
multiplier effects. As unemployment increases and labor demand decreases, wages
also fall to their original levels. Furthermore, there are a few reasons the new bust
equilibrium may be worse off than the original pre-boom equilibrium (Jacobsen and
Parker 2014), at least in a “per-laborer” or “per unit of capital” basis.
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The first reason refers to the aforementioned non-booming traded sectors’ deindustrialization. If de-industrialization occurs, the manufacturing and agriculture
sector activity cannot simply pick up where it left off, but requires heavy capital
investments and time to restore these sectors’ pre-boom capital stock. In the case
of land reclamation, many mining sites are unsuitable for their original agricultural
and forestry uses for years after a mine closes, resulting in an irreversible level of
de-industrialization. A second reason is that some mining operations and locally
consumed sector firms still remain active at substantially lower profit levels, for sunk
capital cost consideration. This results in overcapitalized sectors with low earnings
per unit of capital and fewer employees or fewer shifts for employees, thus leading to
underemployment. A third reason is constrained outward migration. Workers who
came in during the boom period may have been mobile at that stage in their lives,
but have since become tied to the region. Additionally, some laborers who would
otherwise be mobile find their skill set is mismatched to other labor markets’ needs;
thus, moving would not improve their situation.
Timing Issues
While previous studies focus primarily on price or the “increase in the value
of extracted resources” (Weber 2012) to identify when treatment should occur, the
timing of the extraction companies’ behavior may not mimic price behavior perfectly.
Several factors may influence the time frame the actual effects are felt relative to the
event that causes them: whether the shock was anticipated, expectations of whether
the shock is temporary or permanent, whether the shock comes from the supply
side of the resource market (i.e., the mining companies) or the demand side (i.e.,
the resource’s end users), and whether the shock is positive or negative. Appendix
A provides a hierarchical flow chart of how the extraction firm might consider the
shock’s characteristics.
The first characteristic to consider is the expectation of the shock’s duration. A
temporary shock, perhaps a supply chain disruption caused by a hurricane in the
Gulf of Mexico, would not incentivize mine operators to expand much, knowing that
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oil prices would likely drop within a few months. Likewise, the product’s consumers
would likely find that the costs of switching to an alternative fuel in the short run
outweigh the costs of temporarily higher prices in the disrupted market, thus causing
little change in demand conditions as well. Furthermore, whether the shock affects
the supply side or demand side or if the shock is positive or negative would not likely
alter the timing responses in the case of a temporary shock. On the other hand, a
permanent shock, such as the passage of environmental regulation like the CAAA
(despite years of individual states suing the EPA over the act’s provisions), would
generate different timing effects. The timing of mining firm responses to permanent
shocks further depends on the hierarchy’s next levels.
Whether the shock was anticipated or not is the second level. An unexpected shock
to the resource extraction sector, such as the discovery of new reserves (positive) or
worsening conflict in the Middle East (negative), cannot be prepared for; therefore,
employment and wages in the mining sector could lag behind coal prices as demand
rises more quickly than the firms can act. Expanding or opening new mines is often
a time and capital-intensive process and could take months, extending lags further if
current mines are already operating at full capacity. On the other hand, in the case
of an expected shock, such as in response to an announced policy like the CAAA,
the employment and wages could lead coal prices, as mining operations begin to scale
up (down) in anticipation of the price increase (decrease). However, a mining firm’s
behavior ultimately depends on the event’s other characteristics.
The hierarchy’s third level is which side of the market, supply or demand, is
directly affected. For instance, innovations in extraction technology (such as hydraulic
fracturing drilling technology or mountain-top removal excavation techniques) or the
discovery of new proven reserves (such as the North Sea oil fields) act as supply
side shocks. On the other hand, events like the exogenous price increases driven
by the 1970s OPEC oil embargo or the CAAA’s implicit tax on sulfur emissions
affect the demand side. The timing of the mining firm’s response ultimately depends
on the hierarchy’s fourth level: whether the shock is positive or negative. The
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aforementioned supply side examples represent positive shocks. In these cases, mining
companies act as quickly as possible to exploit new profits before their competition
does, thus minimizing lag times that might occur between the event that prompts the
shock and its manifestation in the mining sector’s wages and employment outcomes.
In the case of negative supply side shocks, lags will increase because the mining firms
will want to operate as long as possible to recover as much of their fixed capital
expenditures as they can. How long depends on the specific shock. For instance, an
immediate moratorium on fracking such as the one implemented in New York state
would not allow for any lag in the mining sector’s response. On the other hand, a
shock that causes operating costs to rise would result in a cutback in production,
even resulting in the firm’s operating at a loss. If some fixed costs can continue to
be recovered in the short run, the mining firm will operate as long as possible to
minimize its losses from unrecoverable capital investments. This is true for expected
and unexpected shocks as well as for supply-side and demand-side shocks.
Additionally, in the case of demand side shocks, circumstances in the demand
side firms may cause delayed responses to the event. For instance, switching to a new
fuel may require expensive and time-consuming capital investments, which will cause
lags to extend even more. In both cases of negative shocks, mining firms have no
incentive to cut production. When considering positive demand shocks, the mining
firm may have an incentive to lead the treatment event if it is expected in order to
be positioned to exploit new profit opportunities before its competitors do. While
leading is not possible in unexpected shocks, the firms still act as quickly as possible
for the same reasons, minimizing lags.

3.3

Background of CAAA and Data Selection

The CAAA most notably created the first large-scale emissions cap-and-trade system,
designed to limit the amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) emissions. It required firms to
acquire permits for each ton of SO2 produced, incenting them to reduce emissions
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however they could or to purchase additional permits on the open market. This
policy, which was announced in 1990 and went into effect in 1995, became a de facto
tax on sulfur emissions. As the largest emitters of SO2 , coal- burning power plants
were forced to seek ways to reduce their emissions to avoid this tax. Switching to
coal with less sulfur, which was primarily from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin, was
the primary way this problem was addressed.
Despite the presence of a few mid-grade sulfur coal seams in Appalachia, the region
experienced a sharp decline in mining production following the CAAA’s passage.
These mid-grade sulfur coal seams, located primarily in southern West Virginia and
eastern Kentucky, contained “medium-sulfur” coal, producing approximately 1.2 lbs.
of SO2 emissions per million BTUs1 , right at the limit set by the original Clean Air
Act of 1970 for new power plants (Schmalansee & Stavins 2012; Chan et al. 2012).
While these mid-grade sulfur coal deposits positively affected the demand for the coal
from these seams relative to other Appalachian coal seams, raising the relative price
(see Figure 3.1), overall demand for coal from the region continued to drop as the
West’s low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal replaced it (see Figure 3.2).
As shown in Figure 3.1, the trend of relative coal prices broke in 2000, which seems
plausible given that this is when the cap became “binding.” However, as shown in
Figure 3.2, production may have begun to decline prior to the binding cap.
The CAAA, which was passed in 1990 and which went into effect in 1995,
represents an expected, permanent, negative, demand side shock to the coal industry.
According to the theory presented in Section 3, the mining sector should lag the
event. Mines represent significant capital investments; therefore, the firms want to
recover as much of those fixed costs as possible, even if operating below-average total
costs. As far as the mining firms are concerned, there is certainly no reason to shut
down in advance of the law going into effect because doing so would increase losses
on their fixed costs. These firms continue producing as long as the market’s demand
side continues buying their coal.
1

British Thermal Units (BTUs) are a measure of the quantity of heat
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Figure 3.1: Appreciation of Within State Regional Coal Prices

Figure 3.2: Average Coal Production
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Figure 3.3: Map of Study Region
My study area included counties in Kentucky and West Virginia. I divided this
two-state region into three categories. I adopted the same strategy as Black et al.
(2005) and Marchland (2013) did in identifying counties most likely to be adversely
affected by the policy as those which derive 10% or more of their total earnings from
the coal industry. I considered these my treatment counties, which were treated
with a large negative demand shock. To successfully carry out my DID estimation
of the spillover effects, I had to also identify a proper comparison group, which was
my control group and included all non-mining counties in both states. I excluded
the counties who had relatively smaller mining sectors because it was plausible that
although the CAAA negatively affected these counties’ mining sectors, the sectors did
not represent a significant enough portion of the economy. Dropping these counties
created a “buffer zone” between the treatment group and the control group. In
addition, I dropped four counties from my sample because of large differences in
urban populations. These dropped counties included the urban areas of Louisville,
KY; Lexington, KY; Charleston, WV; and Kenton County, KY (the latter is a suburb
of Cincinnati, Ohio). Dropping these counties resulted in a treatment sample of 31
counties (12 from West Virginia and 19 from Kentucky) and a control group of 98
counties (81 from Kentucky and 17 from West Virginia). Figure 3.2 presents a map
of the study region identifying the different treatments and control groups.
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Despite counties being dropped to create the buffer region, there was still the
potential for spatial spillover effects from these counties. Instances of cross-border
shopping, commuting and business-to-business transactions, particularly to the extent
that they played a role in the regional supply chain, should not be omitted without
appropriate consideration. Unfortunately, my data set and strategy did not directly
address the issues. However, Fryer et al. (2016 NBER working paper) addressed in
detail the issues of geographically dispersing economic shocks in a case study of the
fracking boom in the Western United States. They found that the fracking boom’s
multiplier effects at the county level were actually amplified two to fourfold at the
regional level, depending on the dependent variable, in the 100-mile region from a
boom county’s centroid. This result implies that any multiplier effects I found at the
county level would understate the true regional impact of a policy-induced mining
bust.
My data consisted of observations at the county-year level, with mining industry
variables, population estimates, and variables on county-level payroll, employment,
and number of establishments. I used the Energy Information Agency (EIA) Annual
Coal Reports to collect mine-level data, containing information on production, labor
hours, number of employees, and type of mine (surface or underground). Then I
aggregated this data to the county level. Average annual coal-price data also came
from the EIA and was calculated by dividing the total Free on Board2 value of the
coal sold by the total amount of coal sold. Aggregate data on employment, annual
payroll, and number of establishments from the Census Bureau’s County Business
Patterns data set. Population figures also came from the Census Bureau. I used 1990
Census data to create a set of socio-economic initial conditions used as controls in
the analysis. Table 3.1 provides a comparison of various descriptive statistics for my
control and treatment groups, five years before and after the policy was implented.

2

Free on Board price is the price paid for a good at the beginning point of transportation
rail/barge
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Treatment 1990 Control 1990 Treatment 2000

Control 2000

Population

27,400

30,980

27,970

34,570

Coal Production
(1,000s short tons)

45,000

0

28,600

0

$177,600

$270,600

$191,000

$423,000

7,400

10,400

6,700

13,600

Establishments

520

680 550 790

Land Area
(square miles)

430

320

430

320

N

31

68

30

68

Annual Payroll
(1000s of dollars)
Total Employment
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As can be seen in Table 3.1, there were clear differences between the treatment
and control counties in 1990 despite their similar population sizes. Control counties
averaged about $93 million more in annual payroll, employed approximately 300 more
people, and had an average of 160 more business establishments than their treatment
counterparts. In 2000, 10 years after the policy went into effect, the gaps widened,
suggesting that control counties grew more during that time than treatment counties.

3.4

Empirical Strategy

The primary questions asked in this essay are whether the SO2 permit-trading system
that took effect in 1995 resulted in a bust in central Appalachia’s coal mining industry
and, if so, whether this bust led to negative spillover effects in the local economy’s
non-mining sectors. Implicit in these questions are two more important questions.
First, if there was indeed a structural change in the coefficients on the explanatory
variables in the mining sector, when did this change occur? Second, assuming there
were measurable spillover effects, did they occur at the same time as the changes in
the mining sector?

3.4.1

Direct Effects

To measure the CAAA’s direct effects on the mining sector, I employed a simple trend
break analysis. Because there was no control group for comparison, only the miningintensive counties were considered. This approach is common in the literature when
examining direct effects of a boom/bust in demand (Black et al 2005, Marchland
2012, Weber 2012, Jacobsen and Parker forthcoming). I ran the regression given by
Equation 4.1:

Yi,t = β + β1 ∗ P ostt + β2 ∗ Tt + β3 ∗ P ost ∗ Tt + β4 ∗ KYi + B ∗ Xi,1990 + ei,t (3.1)
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Where Yi,t is the dependent variable, either employment, annual payroll, or
number of establishments. P osti,t is a binary indicator equal to 1 if year is after
the treatment date. Tt is a linear time trend, and P ost ∗ Ti,t is the interaction of
treatment and the linear time trend. The coefficient of interest is β1 , which is the
average difference in the dependent variable after the policy went into effect from
before. This “jump” in the dependent variable is the short term impact of the policy.
β3 is the change in slope after the policy goes into effect, and, while informative,
is more important in determining medium and long term effects. KYi is a state
fixed effect and Xi,1990 is a vector of county- specific socioeconomic controls from the
1990 census, which control for the county’s characteristics at the time of the policy’s
announcement.
Because it is unclear when the mining industry responded to the policy, I used the
test for structural change with an unknown breakpoint proposed by Andrews (1993).
The test is similar to a Chow test; but rather than using t-tests, Wald Statistics
with augmented critical values are used. This strategy has been implemented where
the structural change is the result of both an expected shock and an unexpected
shock. Cozad and LaRiviere (2012) used the technique when examining total vehicle
emissions and emissions per-vehicle-mile traveled in response to the unexpected spike
in oil prices in the 1970s. Similarly, Piehl et al. (2003) also used this strategy in
examining the expected policy aimed at reducing youth homicide rates in Boston
during the 1990s.

In that study, implementation lags justified the use of this

procedure. In both cases, as in my study, there was not a comparison group to
perform a DID estimator in examining the effects’ timing. I varied the treatment
date from 1994 to 2003, one year before the policy began(1995) to three years after
the emissions cap became binding (2000). This exercise’s results are discussed in
Section 5.
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3.4.2

Spillover Effects

To test for the presence of spillover effects, I employed a DID estimator of the form:

Yi,t =α + α1 ∗ Busti + α2 ∗ P ostt + α3 ∗ Busti,t ∗ P ostt
+ α4 ∗ Tt + α5 ∗ KYi + A ∗ Xi,1990 + ei,t

(3.2)

Busti is a binary indicator variable equal to one if county i is a bust county. The
interaction term Busti ∗ P ostt is the treatment, thus α3 is the coefficient of interest.
α3 is the effect that being a bust county after treatment occurs has on the dependent
variable. The variables Yi,t , P ostt , Tt , KYi and Xi,1990 have the same meaning as
before.
As in the case for testing for effects on the mining sector, it is unclear when
treatment should have occurred. In the case of spillover effects, I define treatment
as being in a mining-intensive county after the mining sector experienced a negative
shock. Even though the analysis above indicates that treatment occurred in the
mining sector in 1999, the spillover effects could lag the mining sector. To address this
issue, I conducted the same test for structural changes to identify the exact treatment
date for the dependent variables of employment, annual payroll, and number of
establishments. The results are displayed in Section 5.

3.5
3.5.1

Results
Direct Effects

Figure 3.3 displays the test results for structural change for the mining sector’s
dependent variables of employment, annual payroll, and number of establishments.
As shown in Figure 3.3, the strongest structural break for each dependent variable
occurred in 1999.

Wald Statistics of 22.52, 13.15, and 14.25 were found for
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Figure 3.4: Wald Statistics by Year, Mining Sector
establishments, annual payroll, and employment, respectively. Each of these statistics
is well above the necessary augmented critical value at the 1% level, as Andrews (1993)
tabulated. This was the fifth year the permit trading system was in place but one
year before it became binding.
The lag in the mining companies’ response to the policy supports the theory’s
predictions. As mentioned earlier, if reasons exist for the demand side firms to
postpone responding, lag times for the mining sector’s response would increase.
This was likely a contributing factor in this scenario. The electricity-generation
companies that purchase coal hold on to this inexpensive source of fuel as long as
possible. At the initial policy-implementation date of 1995, the emissions cap was
not binding. That is to say, the cap was set higher than the existing emissions’
level. The electricity companies had no immediate reason to act. Yet as the date the
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cap was to be lowered in 2000 approached, power plants could no longer postpone
their mitigation efforts. For some, the mitigation costs involved installing scrubbers
that helped remove SO2 particulates from plant emissions, allowing some demand
for the high-sulfur coal to remain. However, most had invested in more costly and
time-consuming improvements in their facilities to accommodate different fuel blends,
resulting in sharp declines in demand for the bituminous coal from the region.
Using 1999 as the treatment date, I ran the regression given in Equation 3.1
for employment, annual payroll, and the number of establishments. The results are
displayed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Direct Effects on Mining Sector in Bust Counties

Post
T
T*Post
N
adj. R2

Employment

Establishments

-366∗∗
(173)
-26∗∗
(11)
26∗
(15)
566
0.684

-18∗∗∗
(5.4)
-1.5∗∗∗
(.37)
1.6∗∗∗
(.48)
566
0.660

Payroll
($1,000s)
-$19,556∗∗
(8794)
-$1,190∗∗
(537)
$1,472∗
(760)
566
0.648

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

The variable of interest here is P ost, the indicator variable equal to 1 after the
treatment date determined by the calculated Wald statistics’ supremum. As shown in
Table 3.2, there was a clear and statistically significant drop in mining employment,
payroll, and the number of active mines as a result of the CAAA. Employment
decreased by nearly 1200 workers in the mining sector, accompanied by a $64 million
decrease in total sectoral income. Given an average economy-wide payroll between
$240 and $280 million for treatment counties, a decrease in $64 million is a significant
loss to total county spending power. These results clearly demonstrate a negative
labor shock in the treatment region’s mining sector.
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3.5.2

Spillover Effects-Aggregate Level

As with the policy’s direct effects, I ran a test for structural changes in the parameters
for the model describing the spillover effects. The results are shown in Figure 3.4.
The most significant structural break for each dependent variable occurred at different
times from one another, as well as from the break identified in the mining sector. This
finding indicates a lag in the treatment date for each measurement in the aggregate
economy relative to the mining sector. The structural break occurred in 2001 for the
number of establishments, reporting a Wald statistic of 8.17. The break point for
employment was 2002, reporting a Wald statistic of 12.43; and for annual payroll it
was 2003, reporting a Wald statistics of 7.82. Figures depicting breaks in the data are
in Appendix A. While these breaks are not as strongly significant as those detected in
the mining sector, they too were above the augmented critical values at the 1% level.
This result has critical implications for the resource-extraction literature, showing
that the treatment date on the broader economy may not be the same or the mining
sector, which could impact the results.
Furthermore, I consider these results to be even more informative than the
identified lag in response to the mining sector for two reasons. First, they supports
my view of the existence of two distinct treatment events. The first event is the
policy affecting the mining sector. The second event is the mining sector’s response
affecting the overall economy. The second reason is that these results provide some
insight into how a slumping resource-extraction sector’s effects play out in the rest of
the economy. The number of establishments was first to respond in 2001, two years
after the shock to the mining sector. Employment was second in 2002, and payroll
followed in 2003.
These results raise two questions.

First, why did these different economic

indicators respond at different times? Second, what are the lessons for local/regional
policy makers? The behavioral story behind establishments is likely driven by future
expectations. A business would want to open a new location only when expectations
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Figure 3.5: Wald Statistics by Year, Aggregate Economy
are consistent with a stronger economy because opening a new location involves
a larger investment with more fixed costs than hiring new workers at an existing
location. New businesses are less likely to open locations in a town where potential
economic downturn is right around the corner. On the other hand, payroll and
employment decisions have less fixed cost than opening or closing new establishments;
therefore, they require a less forward-looking approach. Because of the decisionmaking process’s more flexible nature, existing firms can wait longer for conditions to
change before making payroll and personnel decisions. Assuming they were already
operating at a profit-maximizing level of employment and payroll, firms would have no
reason to adjust before any changes in consumer demands and demand for businessto-business services. Additionally, many workers would qualify for unemployment
and would be able to maintain at least a partial level of their spending for the next
two years; thus, demand for local goods and services could be expected to have a
longer lag.
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Therefore, what do these findings mean for local policy makers? In the case of
many negative demand shocks, local politicians can do little to counteract federal
policy that is hurting their local industry. However, understanding the shocks’ time
lines may give them a window within which to work to begin programs dealing
with anticipated negative effects. For instance, such programs include applying for
federal funding for displaced workers’ job training programs and properly staffing
unemployment and disability insurance offices to assist with the influx of claims
accompanying such negative labor shocks (Black, Daniels, Sanders 2002). In terms of
maintaining employment opportunities, politicians can also become actively engaged
in industrial recruitment to facilitate economic diversification, and they can establish
assistance programs for small businesses.
Table 3.3 presents the results for the key explanatory variables.

Being a

bust county negatively affected employment, annual payroll, and the number of
establishments in a statistically significant way, consistent with the story the
descriptive statistics told. The coefficient on Bust ∗ P ost shows that the negative
labor shock in the mining sector created negative spillover effects on the broader
local economy.
Table 3.3: Aggregate Spillover Effects
(1)
Employment
Bust
-865∗∗
(348)
Post
-700
(434)
Bust*Post
-1055∗
(548)
T
260∗∗∗
(34)
N
2460
adj. R2
0.977

(2)
Establishments
-3.8
(14)
-14
(17)
-73∗∗∗
(21)
10∗∗∗
(1.4)
2460
0.987

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(3)
Annual Payroll
-$24,174
(15849)
-$18,197
(19825)
-$61,262∗∗
(26863)
$11,475∗∗∗
(1493)
2460
0.955

The number of establishments decreased by 73, significant at the 1% level,
while the number of employed persons and annual payroll decreased by 1055 and
$61,262,000, respectively, both significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent
with my expectations of a negative labor shock’s effects.
I also ran trend break analysis regressions on the control group for the calculated
treatment dates to test if the control group experienced a similar change in behavior.
If the mining sector was truly driving these results in the treatment group, then
there is no reason why the control group should have experienced a shock at the same
time. My results from this analysis conclude that there was no statistically significant
change in the control county’s behavior for any of the dependent variables.

3.5.3

Comparison to the Standard Approach

In this subsection, I compare the results of my analysis conducted at the true
treatment date vs the “standard” treatment date, set to take place in 1995. Table
3.4 presents a comparison of the direct effects, and Table 3.5 presents a comparison
of the indirect effects.
Table 3.4: Comparison of Standard and Estimated Treatment Effects for Mining
Sector

“Standard” Treatment
Treatment
Difference
N
adj. R2

Employment
-102
(96)
-366∗∗
(173)
264
(197.85)
566
0.683

Establishments
-5.9∗
(3.2)
-18∗∗∗
(5.4)
12.1
(6.27)
566
0.658

Payroll
-$5,135
(4631)
-$19,556∗∗
(8794)
$14,421
(9,938)
566
0.646

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

The first row of Table 3.4 gives the results of the regression with treatment
occurring in 1995, while the second row gives the results with treatment occurring
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in 1999. Giving the difference in the estimates, the third row indicates that the
myopic treatment date underestimated the effect on the mining sector and also
produced statistically insignificant results with the exception of the coefficient on
establishments, which was only weakly significant.
Table 3.5 provides the same analysis for the estimates of the spillover effects into
the aggregate economy. In this case, the myopic estimates tended to overestimate the
spillover effects compared to my calculated treatment date. This finding suggests not
only that testing for the true treatment date was beneficial in terms of understanding
the timing issues related to how an economy responded to a shock, but also that
neglecting to do so could produce incorrect results. The results here indicate that the
myopic treatment date’s results produced larger negative multiplier effects than the
results from my estimated treatment date.
Table 3.5: Comparison of Myopic and Estimated Treatment Effects for Aggregate
Economy

“Myopic” Treatment
Treatment
Difference

Employment
-1756∗∗∗
(548)
-1055∗
(548)
-701
(774.98)

Establishments
-79∗∗∗
(21)
-73∗∗∗
(21)
-6
(29.69)

Payroll
-$101,586∗∗∗
(25,756)
-$61,262∗∗
(26,863)
-$40,324
( 37,215)

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

3.6

Conclusion

Examining the effect of booms and busts in natural resource extraction is nothing new,
and many studies have done so at both the national and subnational level. However,
many of these studies have failed to identify the proper timing of treatment. While
identifying the event that caused the boom may be straightforward, this identification
does not necessarily indicate when treatment occurred.
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To my knowledge, this

study is the first to address this issue by providing a theoretical construct describing
why resource-extraction sectors might actually respond (i.e., receive treatment at
times other than when the event driving treatment occurs). To test my theory’s
predictions, I incorporated a technique proposed by Andrews (1993) that is common
in the program-evaluation literature to test for a break in structural parameters to
identify the treatment date. Testing my theory using the shock to the Appalachian
coal industry induced by the CAAA’s passage, I found that the industry’s response
indeed lagged the implementation of the policy by four years.
Also critical in this study was that the way in which I considered spillover effects’
nature differs from the methods discussed in the existing literature. Rather than
viewing the event that drives the surge in resource extraction as the single event
determining treatment for the extraction sector and the non-extraction sectors, I
examined it as a series of separate treatment events. In this study, the passage of
Title IV of the CAAA of 1990 was the event that induced treatment on the extraction
sector, but the extraction sector’s response induced treatment on the non-mining
sectors. Therefore, I consider this a separate treatment event, which is also subject
to “implementation lags.”
Again using the test for structural change in parameters, I found that treatment
for the broader economy occurred after treatment for the resource extraction sector.
Additionally, different economic variables responded at different times. This finding
has two important implications. First, studies missing this step in the resourceextraction literature could be introducing a source of bias into their estimates.
Second, it not only provides a more accurate measure of the effects of labor shocks in
resource-extraction sectors to the broader local economy, but also gives insight into
these spillover effects’ timing. This information is pertinent to local policymakers
when considering their own resource extraction sectors’ future. For example, when
an impending regulation that might make an existing resource-extraction method
prohibitively expensive, such as a carbon tax, local policy makers who may be
powerless to prevent the policy from happening may instead focus on encouraging
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other industries to take its place. Having insight into the time line of how these
shocks play out in the broader economy would be beneficial in making these decisions.
Furthermore, communities and regions currently experiencing resource-extraction
booms can take these findings regarding the negative multiplier effects of busts
in the extraction sector as impetus to prepare for the future. The following are
two possibilities: (1) creating rainy day funds to protect local government-funding
priorities (such as education, health, and other public services), (2) or using high
government revenue to encourage the establishment and growth of other industries
not reliant on the extraction sector.
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Chapter 4
The Clean Air Act Amendments
and the Low Sulfur Coal Boom
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4.1

Introduction

Despite the overwhelming scientific consensus on the existence of climate change and
its potential for disastrous environmental effects, the political arena still disagrees on
if or how the issue should be addressed. Proponents of action have suggested various
forms of regulation, such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system, citing the success
of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990. Opponents warn of
the disastrous effects environmental regulation will have on the economy, arguing
that increased energy costs will hurt the industry and cost jobs. Several studies
examining the CAAA of 1970 and 1977, which established the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, have found negative consequences for regulated industry
employment in counties failing to meet the established emissions and air quality
criteria (Henderson 1996; Greenstone 2002; Walker 2012). Likewise, the previous
chapter in this dissertation discussed negative employment effects in the Appalachian
coal mining region because of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
Furthermore, environmental regulations, such as the CAAA and the 2015 Clean
Power Plan (CPP), will increase energy costs for all electricity users, whether in
an industry directly regulated or otherwise. Given that electricity prices are major
determinants for manufacturing firms’ decisions (Carlton 1983; Mansur 2012), such
increases have the potential to affect a wide range of industries. The literature
examining regulation beyond the CAAA also discusses environmental regulation’s
negative consequences. For example, Curtis (2014) found that for each additional 1
percentage point of energy intensity in an industry, employment levels decreased by
1.3% as a result of the Nitrous Oxide Budget Trading Program introduced in 2004.
Negative effects on other manufacturing sector indicators, such as the frequency of
plant openings and the productivity levels in regulated industries, are also discussed
throughout the literature (Becker and Henderson 2000; Dean et al. 2000; List et al.
2003; Henderson 1996; Hanna 2010; Greenstone et al. 2012).
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The literature focuses overwhelmingly on the effects of manufacturing and
electricity-generating sectors, but this focus represents only one side of the story.
As with any industry, when costs for one product rise, existing substitutes increase
their market share and new ones enter the market.

The increased demand for

these substitutes generate job growth in these industries; and rather than being job
killers, as environmental regulations are often called by their opponents, they are job
shifters. In the context of Title IV of the CAAA, the SO2 cap-and-trade system
implemented under Title IV resulted in an implicit tax on high-sulfur bituminous
coal. The most readily available substitute for Appalachia’s high-sulfur bituminous
coal was the American West’s low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal. The flexibility in
choice of abatement method offered by Title IV resulted in many coal-burning
power plants’ changing their fuel blends to incorporate low-sulfur coal. The ensuing
increased demand for sub-bituminous coal led to a positive labor demand shock for the
region’s mining industry. This positive demand shock led to a potential for positive
employment effects on not only the coal sector, but also other sectors of the local
economies where coal was extracted through spillover effects.
Previous studies have examined spillover effects from locally booming resource
extraction sectors, and two competing theories have emerged for predicting such
booms’ effects. One theory involves the resource curse and Dutch disease, pointing to
crowding out, local institutions’ misappropriating revenues, and controlling outside
interests as the causes of many resource rich economies’ poor economic conditions.
In contrast, the agglomeration theory points to increased investment, population
influxes, and technology spillovers as the causes of positive spillover effects seen in
other resource-rich regions. Marchland (2012) and Matheis (2014) found negative
effects on traded sectors, while Michaels (2010) found positive effects .
This essay contributes to the literature examining environmental regulation’s
effects on employment as well as to the literature on local labor demand shocks.
I first asked if the mining industry experienced a positive shock from the passage of
the CAAA of 1990. After finding that it did, I tested for local multiplier effects. I also
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have built on the analysis of the previous chapter of this dissertation, which describes
why there may be lags or leads in treatment effects relative to policy implementation,
as well as lags or leads in the spillover effects relative to demand shock in the resource
extraction sector. I do so by decomposing the multiplier effects into sector-specific
shocks to test if different sectors of the economy respond at different times.
As a result of the policy, the mining industry employed an average of 312 more
workers, and the total sectoral payroll increased by nearly $50 million at the county
level. These findings are consistent with the idea that increased demand for lowsulfur coal created a positive labor demand shock in the mining sector. This would
be an increase of $160,000 per new worker, indicating that wages for those already
employed in the sector increased as well. This increase could be the effect of individual
workers’ working more hours or increased wages per hour. I found mixed results
regarding the spillover effects on locally-consumed sectors. The retail sector gained
almost 500 jobs. However, the retail sector lost $15,000,000 in total sectoral payroll
while the construction sector lost $26,740,000. For the traded sectors of agriculture
and manufacturing, I again found mixed results. The agriculture sector gained 87
jobs and $1,911,000 in total sectoral payroll, while the manufacturing sector had no
statistically significant impact. These findings suggest, at least to a small extent,
that there were positive multiplier effects in traded good sectors, consistent with the
agglomeration effects model.
These results can be applied to policy makers’ decisions at the local, state and
national levels.

At the local level, policy makers can seize the opportunity to

increase local employment by attracting new industries to locate and grow within their
districts. In the context of environmental regulation, this is particularly important
for policy makers in jurisdictions that will be hurt by new regulations. Rather than
fighting to save jobs in a costly, dirty industry, policy makers can begin trying to ease
the transition to new industry.
For instance, policy makers could lobby for firms in the new substitute industry
that will compete with or replace the old, dirty industry to locate within their district.
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Given the transition costs for workers who switch sectors (Walker 2011), policy makers
at both levels could also attempt to create policies to help smooth the transition
from regulated sectors to cleaner sectors for reallocated laborers, thus reducing these
costs. National policy makers can use these findings as evidence that environmental
regulation also has the potential to create new jobs to replace jobs lost in the industry
it is regulating. This potential for new jobs is particularly important given the heavy
focus previous research has given to the negative effects on employment outcomes in
regulated sectors.
The rest of this essay proceeds as follows. Section two discusses the existing
literature on booming resource extraction sectors. Section three discusses how Title
IV of the CAAA of 1990 affected the study region. Section four discusses the data
sources and sample selection. Section five outlines the empirical strategy. Section six
discusses the results and section seven concludes.

4.2

Conceptual Framework and Previous Literature

A booming sector at a local level affects other local sectors’ labor markets in several
ways. One immediate effect is that the booming sector increases labor demand,
thus driving up employment and total income. This additional income is then spent
in the local economy, increasing demand in other sectors such as retail, services, and
construction. In addition, as the booming sector expands, it also demands more goods
and services, increasing business-to-business transactions. Furthermore, other sectors,
both tradeable and non-tradeable, can benefit in the long run from new infrastructure,
technology spillovers, and agglomeration effects, as well as from increased government
revenue resulting from an enlarged tax base. However, a downside is the potential
for increased wages and prices of other locally sourced factor input. If the market
for inputs is already tight, a sudden increase in demand will cause prices to rise as
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well, in turn deterring expansion of existing firms or entry of new firms. As traded
goods sector output price is determined by the national economy and not locally,
factor input prices’ sudden rise could even lead to a contraction in the size of traded
sectors competing for locally supplied factor inputs. If crowding out happens to the
extent that industry-specific infrastructure is dismantled, the local economy could
experience Dutch Disease-type effects seen in national economies.
The literature examining local labor demand booms covers a variety of causes.
For example, large firms’ sitings in a community could cause a surge in labor demand
at the local level. However, some of the studies offer conflicting results. For example,
Fox and Murray (2004) showed that these large plant sitings have no net economic
benefits, suggesting that bidding wars to attract such firms may be ill advised. On
the other hand, Greenstone and Moretti (2004), who also conducted a study on plant
openings by comparing employment outcomes for the various communities that bid
for the plant to locate there, found that a successful bid was correlated with a 1.5%
earnings increase in that sector.
Another example of a shock to local labor demand is the implementation of
government-designated “enterprise zones,” areas where local governments encourage
economic activity by offering incentives such as tax concessions, infrastructure
development, or reduced regulations. Investigations of designated enterprise zones,
which should generate similar increases in local labor demand, have also produced
mixed results. Some studies found positive effects on short-term employment (O’Keefe
2004; Busso and Kline 2007), while other studies concluded that such designations
produce no significant effect on local employment other than reallocated labor (Kolko
and Neumark 2010a; Neumark and Neumark 2010; Hanson 2009).
More closely related to my study are studies that investigated the economic effects
of increased labor demand stemming from booms in natural resource extraction.
Michaels (2010) studied the long-term economic impact on counties located over
significant oil fields. Rather than finding inhibited growth seen with resource-based
national economies, often referred to as the resource curse (Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004;
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Sachs and Warner 1997; Sachs and Warner 2001) and in some instances at the
county level (Douglas and Walker 2013), Michaels found positive effects on population
growth, education, and manufacturing. This finding is in line with the agglomeration
effects theory. However, this essay focused on a boom’s effects in local resource
extraction in the short-to-medium terms, for which there are several relevant studies.
Matheis (2014) examined not only county-level outcomes in coal mining counties
for population and median family income, but also employment levels in several
other sectors from 1870 to 1970.

In his study, identification came from county

variation in three different measures of lagged coal production, with each accounting
for different time frames, allowing him to assess short-term and long-term impacts.
Although Matheis found evidence of short-run positive spillover effects on employment
levels of locally-consumed sectors, he found negative long-run effects, in contrast to
Michaels’ results (2010). He also found negative short-run and long-run effects on
manufacturing employment, providing evidence supporting the crowding out effect
symptomatic of Dutch Disease. In a study examining the local employment effects
of a boom in natural gas fracking in the Western United States, Weber (2012) found
that total employment increased by 1.5% on average for boom counties, while average
wage and salary incomes increased 2.6%, in line with theoretical predictions.
Black et al. (2005) and Marchland (2012) examined a boom-bust cycle in resource
extraction. Identifying treatment areas as counties or census division tracts that
derive 10% of their total income from resource extraction, these researchers used
difference-in-differences (DID) estimators to examine spillover effects of booming
resource-extraction sectors. Black et al. (2005) found that employment increased 2%
annually in treatment counties during a boom and contracted 2.7% annually during
the bust. Job multipliers were also calculated, finding that every 10 jobs created in
the mining sector led to approximately 2 jobs for the local construction, retail, and
services sectors. Again, the bust seemed to have stronger effects than the boom, as
Black et al. found that for every 10 coal jobs lost, 3 jobs across other sectors were
lost. Marchalnd (2012) found that booms had positive impacts on total personal
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income; but contrary to Black et al. (2005), no evidence of contraction during busts
was found. Marchland (2012) also calculated job multipliers, finding that every 10
jobs created in the energy extraction sector created 1.2 jobs, 1.7 jobs, and 3.6 jobs in
the construction, retail, and services sectors, respectively.

4.3

Background and Study Areas

Title IV of the CAAA decreased the demand for high-sulfur coal and increased it for
low-sulfur coal, as coal-burning power plants needed to lower their emissions to avoid
being forced to purchase a sulfur dioxide emission permit that the law established.1
This policy increased demand for low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal, which was
substituted for higher-sulfur bituminous coal in coal-burning power plants. Before
the policy was implemented, demand for this coal was relatively lower than coal from
the East because of the costs of switching fuel blends in power plants as well as
the relatively higher costs involved in transporting coal to the power plants located
primarily in the Eastern half of the United States. As low-sulfur coal became more
valuable, plant operators became more willing to bear these costs, allowing Western
mines to profitably increase their production. The Powder River Basin, which spans
Northeast Wyoming and Southeast Montana, accounts for much of the coal mined
in the region, as well as for approximately 85% of the nation’s accessible low-sulfur
coal reserves. Utah, New Mexico, and Colorado also contain sub-bituminous coalproducing counties and are included in the sample. Total coal production from the
study region is displayed in Figure 4.1.
1
Low-sulfur coal is defined as having fewer than .6 lbs. of sulfur per million Btu, medium-sulfur
coal as having between .6 and 1.6 lbs. of sulfur per million Btu, and high-sulfur coal as having more
than 1.6 lbs. sulfur per million Btu. Medium- and high-sulfur coal still retained some of its value
because power plants could adjust their burners to operate on blended-low and medium/high-sulfur
coal.
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Figure 4.1: Western Coal Production

4.4

Data and Sample Description

The data consists of county-year observations spanning from 1988 until 2007 for
population, total annual payroll, and employment by sector. The Energy Information
Agency (EIA) Annual Coal Reports were used to collect mine-level data, including
information on production, labor hours, number of employees, and type of mine
(surface or underground). This data was then aggregated to the county level. Average
annual coal prices also came from the EIA and were calculated by dividing the total
Free on Board value of the coal sold 2 by the total amount of coal sold. Employment,
payroll, and population came from the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns
database. Average wages were unavailable and thus were calculated by dividing the
total sectoral income by the sectoral employment, a practice consistent with similar
studies (Marchland 2012, Black et al. 2005).
The 1990 Census data were used to create a set of socio-economic initial conditions
used as controls in the analysis. Unfortunately, in both employment data and payroll
2

Free on Board price is the price paid for a good at the beginning point of transportation
rail/barge
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data, some observations were missing for agriculture, construction and manufacturing.
Some data were withheld for disclosure reasons, while others were bottom coded as
10 for employment figures and $50,000 for payroll figures. This could bias estimates
upwards. A Heckman two-step estimation process, which is further discussed in
Section 5, was used to address the missing data.
Counties lying over low-sulfur coal beds that increased production were designated
as “boom counties,” representing 22 of the 30 coal mining counties.

The eight

non-boom mining counties were excluded from the control group because they
would probably have experienced negative effects and biased the results upward.
Contraction in a resource extraction sector results in decreased employment in the
mining sector, thus lowering total employment and total income, and in turn demand
for local goods. The newly unemployed would also bid down the price of labor,
lowering total income and local demand even further. This reduction in labor costs
could improve the traded goods sectors’ competiveness. The predicted effects are
opposite in this case, and including these counties in the control group would make
these effects in boom counties seem larger than they really were. The control group
consisted of non-mining counties in five states, thus leaving a sample size of 18
treatment counties and 175 counties for the control group from the Western states.
A map of the study region is provided in Appendix B.
Table 4.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the treatment and control regions
from 1990 to 2000, thus providing a snapshot comparison of the treatment and control
groups five years before and after the policy was implemented. As shown in Table 4.1,
treated counties have larger populations on average, but lower levels of employment
and income per capita.

4.5

Empirical Strategy

I measure how the passage of Title IV of the CAAA of 1990 affected both the mining
and non-mining sectors. The own-industry effects were measured to provide evidence
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Treatment
1990

Control
1990

Treatment
2000

Control
2000

Population

23,350

40,100

27,500

50,400

Coal Production
(1,000s short tons)

1,503

0

25,000

0

Income Per Capita
(2005 dollars)

$14,400

$15,100

$23,200

$23,300

Total Employment

11,700

23,000

15,300

32,000

3880

2640

3880

2640

18

175

18

175

Land Area
(square miles)
N

of a boom in the mining sector. To measure a booming mining sector’s spillover effects
on other sectors’ total employment and annual payroll, a difference-in-differences
strategy was used to obtain estimates for the dependent variable’s jump at the time
of treatment.
The results from the own-industry analysis were also used to create a simple job
multiplier, measuring how many jobs were created/destroyed in a non-mining sector
per 10 jobs created in the mining. To ensure the treatment date was measured
correctly, the test put forth by Andrews (1993) for changes in structural parameters
was employed and is elaborated on in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The results of
this test are provided in the next section.

4.5.1

Own-Industry Effects

Because the control group had no mining sector to compare to, a simple trend break
analysis with a binary treatment indicator was used. The estimation equation is given
by Equation 4.1:
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Yi,t = α0 + α1 P ostt + Φ(State ∗ Y ear) + βXi + i,t

(4.1)

The dependent variable Yi,t represents either mining sector employment or payroll
in county i in year t. P ostt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is after the
treatment date. State ∗ Y ear is a vector of state-year fixed effects. Xi is a vector of
county-specific socio-economic control variables from 1990, the time the policy was
announced; these variables include land area, the number of households receiving
social security income, county-level federal expenditures, the number of reported
violent crimes, the valuation of new housing units, and the number of families
in poverty. The coefficient of interest, α1 , estimates the average difference in the
dependent variable before and after treatment.

4.5.2

Spillover Effects

To measure spillover effects, a DID estimator was used for the employment and
mining outcomes of the retail, construction, manufacturing and agriculture sectors.
To address the issue of missing data, the two-step Heckman selection model was
employed. The following two-stage regression was estimated. The first stage is a
probit model determining the selection’s probability and was used to generate the
inverse mills ratio, λβ. The first stage is given by Equation 4.2:
P rob(D = 1|Zit ) = Φ(Zit γ)

(4.2)

where D is the probability of selection into missing observations; and Zi,t is a vector
of explanatory variables determining selection, including population, quantity of coal
produced in short tons, the number of open Walmarts, and land area, all for a county
in a given year. γ is a vector of unknown parameters, and φ is the cumulative
distribution function ofthe standard normal distribution.
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The second stage is the augmented OLS regression, which uses the probit estimates
for γ, γ̂ from the first stage. Equation 4.3 is a standard DID estimator in which
treatment is binary and equal to one in boom counties after the treatment year
identified for each dependent variable:
Yit =α0 + α1 Boomi + α2 P ostt + α3 T reatment
+ Φ(State ∗ Y ear) + βXi + ρσy λ(Zit γ̂) + it

(4.3)

where α0 is a constant, Boomi indicates a boom county, P ostt is a binary indicator
equal to 1 for years after the CAAA goes into effect. State ∗ Y ear and Xit are the
same as in Equation 4.1. α3 , the coefficient of interest, is the difference in the discrete
change in control counties and the discrete change in the dependent variable in boom
counties at the time of treatment.

4.6

Results

The results are broken down into three sections. First, the results for the test for
changes in structural parameters are presented. Then, after the proper treatment
date is identified, the CAAA’s effects on the mining sector and the spillover effects
on other sectors are presented.

4.6.1

Identification of Treatment Date

The analysis provided in the previous chapter of this dissertation’s predicts that the
mining sector should lag an anticipated, permanent, positive demand-side shock. The
key reason for this lag is that it would not be profitable for the mining companies
to increase production until demand warrants it, so the lag is largely driven by the
electricity-generating firms’ behavior. Because it took a few years for power plants to
fit their burners to accommodate different fuel blends, the change to the lower-sulfur
sub-bituminous coal was not immediate.
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Figure 4.2: Wald Statistics for Mining Sector
Figure 4.2 shows the most significant change in the mining sector occurred in 1999
for payroll and in 2001 for employment. This finding is consistent with the timing of
events found in the Appalachian mining industry discussed in the previous chapter.
The same technique was applied to the individual sectors to determine the proper
treatment date for each. The results are summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Summary of Tests for Proper Treatment Date
Sector

Payroll

Employment

Construction

1994

1997

Retail

1994

1998

Manufacturing

2002

2002

Agriculture

1998

1998

Table 4.2 shows that for both the traded goods sectors, payroll and employment,
received treatment at the same time.

In the locally-consumed goods sectors of
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construction and retail, employment lagged behind payroll by three and four years,
respectively. Additionally, manufacturing lagged behind all other sectors by four years
in payroll. The relatively quicker response of the locally consumed sectors compared
to manufacturing could be because the theoretical reason behind the sector’s growth
is agglomeration effects, which would likely take a few years to accrue. Additionally,
the construction, retail, and agriculture sectors all lead the mining sector for payroll
and employment.

4.6.2

Direct Effects
Table 4.3: Effects on Mining Sector

Post
N

Employment

Payroll

312∗∗∗
(67)
396

$47,989∗∗∗
(6827)
396

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

As seen in Table 4.3, the surge in demand for the West’s low-sulfur sub-bituminous
coal brought on by the CAAA resulted in a boom in the region’s mining industry.
The policy caused an increase of over 300 jobs and an increase in total sectoral payroll
of nearly $50 million dollars, both significant at the 1% level. Income increased by
approximately $166,000 per new worker, indicating that average wages rose across
the industry for new and existing workers. Both of these results are in line with the
predictions of the effects of a surge in demand for the natural resource and provide
impetus to investigate the potential for spillover effects into other economic sectors.
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4.6.3

Spillover Effects

While two competing theories offer predictions on the direction of spillover effects on
traded sectors, both predict positive effects on locally consumed sectors. Table 4.4
shows mixed support for these theories. Concerning the locally consumed sectors of
retail and construction, we would expect increased consumption demand from the
newly employed mine workers to increase demand in these sectors. As expected,
the retail sector gained 491 jobs, significant at the 10% level. However, there was
also a statistically significant decrease on total sectoral payroll, opposite of what the
theory predicts. The construction sector also showed evidence of a negative spillover
effect, losing $26,743,000 in total sectoral income with no statistically significant
impact on employment. While the positive effect on retail was expected, the negative
effect on the construction sector contradicts both theories. One explanation for this
unexpected negative effect is the possibility that the existing stock of housing and
commercial space was sufficient enough to meet an increased demand for new building.
If people and businesses are moving into existing structures, then construction would
not sharply rise.
The effects on the traded sector provide some evidence of agglomeration effects.
While there was no statistically significant impact on manufacturing employment or
payroll, the agriculture sector increased by 87 jobs and $1,911,000 in total sectoral
payroll. These increases are important for the local economy’s health given the
harmful local environmental effects of coal mining that often destroy agriculture
production.

4.6.4

Simple Jobs Multipliers

Using the own-industry and spillover results from the previous two subsections, a
simple job multiplier was created showing how many jobs in other sectors were
created/lost per 10 mining jobs created. For every 10 jobs created in the mining
sector, the traded sectors of agriculture and manufacturing gained 2.8 and 21.9 jobs,
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Table 4.4: Spillover Effects

Boom
Post
Treatment
N

Boom
Post
Treatment
N
adj. R2

Agriculture
Employment

Agriculture
Payroll

Manufacturing
Employment

Manufacturing
Payroll

-58∗∗
(28)
-669∗∗∗
(37)
87∗∗
(40)
3920

-$1,415∗∗
(555)
-$12,253∗∗∗
(733)
$1,911∗∗
(803)
3920

-279∗
(156)
-2,409∗∗∗
(284)
401
(283)
3920

-$10,069
(7414)
-$71,623∗∗∗
(13495)
$13,310
(13444)
3920

Construction
Employment

Construction
Payroll

Retail
Employment

Retail
Payroll

660∗∗∗
(242)
4152∗∗∗
(298)
-525
(326)
3920

$32,257∗∗
(13215)
$122,521∗∗∗
(12956)
-$26,743∗
(15768)
3920

-154
(202)
-2455∗∗∗
(267)
491∗
(285)
3920
0.975

$15,632∗∗
(6557)
$64,066∗∗∗
(6428)
-$15,044∗
(7824)
3920
0.964

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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respectively. In the locally consumed sectors of retail and construction, for every 10
jobs created in the mining sector, retail gained 15.8 jobs while construction lost 16.8
jobs.

4.7

Conclusion

This essay contributes to the understanding of environmental regulation’s employment effects using the framework of studies examining booms’ impact in resource
extraction sectors. While many studies on environmental regulation have focused
on job loss caused by increasing costs to regulated industries, this study examined
the employment effects in communities where substitute industries were located.
With Title IV of the CAAA 1990 identified as the cause of a positive labor
shock in the American West’s mining sectors, this essay asks two questions. Does
this environmental regulation also create jobs in industries that compete with the
regulated industry? If so, are the effects of these competing industries large enough
to cause positive spillover effects in other sectors of the local economy where these
industries are growing?
The mining sector gained jobs and increased total sectoral payroll as a result of the
policy, indicating that the policy did in fact cause a boom in the region’s mining sector.
However, the spillover on employment in other industries offers only weak evidence
supporting the agglomeration effects theory. In the agriculture sector, statistically
significant gains were found in both employment and total sectoral payroll, while in
the manufacturing sector gains were also found, but not at any statistically meaningful
level.
These results have important implications given the need to address carbondioxide (CO2 ) emissions, where a cap-and-trade system similar to the one implemented by Title IV of the CAAA is being considered under the Clean Power Plan. The
existing literature on environmental regulations consistently shows that regulations
have negative employment effects on regulated industries, validating the concerns that
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increasing energy prices will have negative effects. However, just as with the CAAA,
restrictions lowering the demand for CO2 intensive processes will increase demand
in less CO2 intensive substitutes, thus shifting jobs away from the former to the
latter. It is also useful to consider the coincidental timing of rail freight deregulation
in the 1980s that greatly lowered the cost of transporting sub-bituminous coal from
the West to the East, where the majority of coal-burning power plants are located.
This deregulation helped reduce the costs of switching from Appalachia’s high-sulfur
coal with shorter transportation distances to the low-sulfur coal that had to travel
across the country. This deregulation suggests that similar policies to help ease the
transition to substitute industries may increase the job-growth potential in these
industries. One example of a complimentary policy in the context of CO2 regulations
would be tax incentives for manufacturing and distributing solar panels.
Regarding local policy makers whose districts may be hurt by such regulations,
recruiting new industries to replace lost activity in the regulated sector would be
prudent. Policy makers should also focus on training programs and job-placement
assistance to help newly displaced workers transition to new jobs and on providing
small business development assistance, all activities consistent with the Pareto
compensation principle.

90

Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation is comprised of three essays in policy analysis. The first outlines
a dynamic general equilibrium model which is used to study revenue mobilization
in developing economies who also have large informal sectors. We ask, how policy
changes in tax rates and enforcement can be used to increase the level of formal sector
activity while also increasing government revenue. Contrary to much of the existing
literature, our simulations show that under certain conditions, increasing taxes can
actually achieve the aforementioned goal. The key component of the model that
allows the model to produce this result is the ability for the government to provide
productive public goods, which also enables the government to maintain its delicate
fiscal social contract with its constituents.
In the second essay, I contribute to the literature on resource extraction
booms/busts by focusing on the proper selection of treatment date. First, I develop
a theoretical framework for explaining why direct treatment effects and spillover
effects might lag or lead the event causing the labor shock in the extraction sector.
Furthermore, I argue that the assumption that treatment on the resource extraction
sector and the adjacent sectors of the economy occur simultaneously does not hold
and introduces bias into the estimates. I use the introduction of the SO2 cap and
trade program implemented by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments as a source
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of a negative shock to the Appalachian coal mining industry. To test the predictions
of my framework, I employ the test for change in structural parameters introduced by
Andrews (1993), and find that treatment in the mining sector occurs four years after
the policy became effective in 1995. I also find that there is a second lag between the
time the mining industry is affected and the spillover effects on the local aggregate
economy are felt.
The final essay investigates environmental regulations effect on employment. The
existing literature focuses on the negative impact on employment of regulation caused
by increased cost of doing business. However, the question of whether the policy also
creates jobs in other industries is largely ignored. In addition, this essay tests the
predictions of the theoretical analysis in the case of a positive labor demand shock
and explores the timing of multiplier effects at the sector level. Using the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 as a source of positive labor shock in the Western United
States coal industry, whose coal was a substitute for Appalachias high sulfur coal, I
find strong evidence of a boom in the regions mining sector. This boom lagged the
treatment event by 4 years. I also find mixed evidence of positive spillover effects,
with the retail and manufacturing sectors gaining jobs, but construction and retail
losing in total sectoral income. I also discuss the implications these findings have for
local policy makers whose communities are dependent on natural resource extraction,
as well as national policy makers focusing on initiatives like the Clean Power Plan.
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